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1
THINKING INSIDE THE BOX: 
DEFINING THE PROBLEM
1.1 OVERVIEW
This chapter offers a brief overview of the present state of 
evidence on regional disparities across Britain. We discuss the 
importance of different measures of regional economic perfor-
mance before going on to challenge and extend conventional 
measures. The post-Brexit environment will pose notable 
challenges for regional policy, but also offers the opportunity 
to reassess regional needs and appropriate funding formulae. 
The chapter is laid out as follows:
•	 Introduction – Brexit forces us to reconsider regional 
inequalities and the introduction outlines the key issues 
that need to be addressed.
•	 Defining the region – The shifting sands of British regional 
policy have seen regions successively redefined from the 
top down. Here the authors reconsider various regional 
designations.
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•	 Existing measures – This portion of the chapter outlines 
the main measures used to assess regional economic 
performance, most notably gross value added (GVA).
•	 Commuting – The chapter then describes how commuting 
has a major distortionary effect on GVA per capita – a 
measure used by the European Union (EU) in decisions 
about structural funding.
•	 Demographics – In this section, we consider the ways 
in which demographic factors can also have an impact 
on estimates of regional economic performance and 
deprivation.
•	 Towards a better measure – The chapter concludes by 
putting forward preferred measures of regional economic 
performance, whilst noting that all can be suffer from 
some crucial weaknesses that we address throughout the 
rest of the book.
1.2 INTRODUCTION
The Brexit vote has shone a harsh light on something that 
academics and practitioners have known for years: regional 
differences matter. In the West Midlands, almost 60% of votes 
were to leave the EU. In London, almost 60% of votes were 
to remain. Indeed, some have argued that the vote should be 
seen as the ‘revenge of places that don’t matter’ (Rodríguez-
Pose, 2018). This has occurred in spite of the fact that EU 
structural funding has been concentrated in many of these 
regions and that a number of them are particularly exposed 
to EU trade (Los, McCann, Springford, & Thissen, 2017).
One of the most interesting findings from our recent 
‘Brexit Roadshow’ has been a pervasive sense of inequity 
and abandonment across a diverse range of communities. 
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Comments such as ‘they [London] get everything’ (De Ruyter, 
Hearne, Guy, Semmens-Wheeler, & Goodwin, Forthcoming) 
and ‘nobody cares’ alongside disparaging remarks about the 
local area (De Ruyter et al., Forthcoming) illustrate communi-
ties that often seethe with resentment at perceived iniquities 
in the allocation of services.
Certainly, the extent of spatial inequality within the UK 
across some measures is striking (McCann, 2016). A man 
born in Blackpool can expect a lifespan shorter than his Alba-
nian equivalent (Office for National Statistics (ONS), 2016a; 
World Health Organisation, 2016). A woman born in Kens-
ington, in contrast, can expect to live past her 86th birth-
day, rivalling Japan for the world’s longest life expectancy. 
These differences are stark – if Blackpool could halve the gap 
between itself and Barnet in North London then the effects 
would be transformative. We also note that there is at least 
prima facie evidence of a link between some of them and the 
Brexit vote (Bell & Machin, 2016; Pidd, 2016).
This book makes a fundamental contribution to our 
understanding of these regional disparities in the light of 
Brexit, by introducing new measures that can help us fur-
ther our understanding of those areas that have been ‘left-
behind’. In doing so, it is necessary to tackle the fundamental 
issues in a systematic and logical way. As the infographic 
below demonstrates, the first is the question is what policy 
makers and practitioners are ultimately seeking to answer. In 
order to do this, however, the latter two questions must be 
addressed. After all, the appropriate policy response is likely 
to be very different depending on the answer to the second 
question, and much academic ink has been spilled trying to 
resolve it. In many ways, however, it is the third question that 
is most fundamental of all. In order to judge potential policy 
actions, we need to understand what regional success and 
failure look like.
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Although we know that regional imbalances in the UK 
span almost every domain, good policy requires more knowl-
edge than this. In particular, it is necessary to quantify ‘suc-
cess’ both in terms of living standards and the functional 
economic geography of an area. Existing measures fail to 
capture important aspects of both of these and the proposed 
‘deflated’ measures can extend our understanding of these.
This book therefore builds upon official data and inter-
national best practice to develop a series of measures with 
which to assess regional living standards and economic 
performance before exploring the ramifications of these in 
light of the UK’s vote to leave the EU. We begin by critiquing 
what has become the de facto measure of regional economic 
performance – GVA per capita – and draw upon existing 
research to do so.
The main body of the book is concerned with deriving 
measures to best capture the true differences in both living 
standards and productivity across regions, particularly given 
that both academic evidence (Los et al., 2017) and a majority 
of experts believe that Brexit threatens to exacerbate these 
(De Ruyter, Hearne, & Tsiligiris, in prep.). Regional statistics 
in the UK do not take into account differences in the cost of 
living across the country.
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This impacts a wide variety of measures including GVA, 
household incomes and wages. Happily, methodological 
developments over recent decades and the emergence of a 
greater variety of official data sources enable us to make an 
initial attempt to develop deflators to adjust for these issues. 
Although some of the methodological distinctions between 
different deflators are subtle, the overall issue and direction 
of adjustment is clear.
This is key to developing appropriate policy measures, both 
to mitigate the impact of Brexit on more vulnerable regions 
and household and to address many of the insecurities and 
inequalities that played a factor in the vote to leave the EU. 
The final portion of the book therefore discusses the policy 
questions raised by these issues. Brexit affords an opportunity 
to reassess funding formulae and we argue that this must take 
the findings of this book into account. Particular attention 
needs to be paid to the likely evolution of regional policy and 
funding in the light of Brexit.
1.3 DEFINING THE REGION
Recent years have seen a growing awareness of the impor-
tance of regional differences within the UK. Indeed, even 
the Chief Economist of the Bank of England has recently 
acknowledged the importance of regional differences across 
the UK economy (Haldane, 2018). It is clear that not only is 
the UK spatially unbalanced in an economic and social sense, 
but as continued interest in the so-called ‘West Lothian ques-
tion’ shows, there is also a clear political imbalance between 
the devolved administrations in Scotland, Wales and North-
ern Ireland and the English regions.
As noted by Benneworth (2006), there are historical ante-
cedents to the present devolution agenda. Added to this is the 
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need for a distinction between the region as an economic unit 
and the region as a facet of identity (Roberts & Baker, 2006). 
Indeed, the rise of a more assertive English identity that the 
Brexit vote has made clear (Henderson et al., 2016) could be 
seen as threatening this nascent regionalisation of politics. 
The overwhelming vote against a regional assembly in the 
North East of England in 2004 (Wood, Valler, Phelps, Raco, 
& Shirlow, 2006) might be seen in the same vein. Brexit itself 
exhibits a significant regional dimension with some recent 
research finding that regional differences in measured (psycho-
logical) character traits might have been important in the refer-
endum (Garretsen, Stoker, Soudis, Martin, & Rentfrow, 2018).
Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that regional identity in 
Britain remains somewhat inchoate, the fact remains that the 
region is often the more sensible level on which to carry out 
economic policy. In fact, identity in the UK is often local more 
than regional – witness the fierce rivalry between underland 
and Newcastle (those who ‘mackem’ vs. those who ‘tackem’) 
or Birmingham and the Black Country. This may, in part, be a 
result of the historic political centralisation of the UK which 
has seen regional boundaries adjusted numerous times over the 
past century without adequate study as to what the functional 
economic geography looks like (Roberts & Baker, 2006).
We are left with three potential ways in which to ‘region-
alise’ the UK.
In practical terms, it is not feasible to use TTWAs as they 
presently stand. Their major attraction is that they poten-
tially capture the economic geography of an area better 
than any alternative. Unfortunately, for our purposes the 
75% threshold is probably not appropriate, particularly 
given that mean values can be significantly affected by the 
commuting patterns of a relatively modest number of high 
income individuals. Given this, their failure to align with any 
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Fundamentally, however, there is a relative paucity of data 
(particularly price data) on these areas, making them unus-
able for our purposes.
The attraction of using city-regions lies in their politi-
cal salience. The emphasis of the so-called ‘New Econom-
ic Geography’ on agglomeration chimes nicely with this 
political zeitgeist, even though this may be more relevant 
to present-day developing countries than the UK (Krug-
man, 2011). Indeed, although the benefits of agglomeration 
are considered axiomatic by some in the policy commu-
nity (Swinney, 2016), the empirical evidence is far from 
incontrovertible.
For example, Frick and Rodriguez-Pose (2018) find that 
small cities (up to 3 million inhabitants) are most conducive 
to rapid economic growth and some French data suggest 
that agglomeration effects are likely to be modest on a plant-
level (Martin, Mayer, & Mayneris, 2011). Indeed, although 
some have found that agglomeration might support produc-
tivity growth (Rice, Venables, & Patacchini, 2006), recent 
work suggests that historical development paths are crucial 
(Beugelsdijk, Klasing, & Milionis, 2018).
Research suggests that, in the UK at least, the performance 
of cities and urban areas is intimately linked to the regions in 
which they are located (McCann, 2016). In addition, choice of 
residential location within a region (and the associated differ-
ences in cost) may in large part be due to differences in ameni-
ties offered. This, together with consumer preferences may 
partly explain differences between urban centres and their 
associated peri-urban areas and rural fringes. As a result, we 
initially consider differences at the level of nomenclature of ter-
ritorial units for statistics (NUTS) Regions, before reconsider-
ing the impact of our results at a more granular level. In doing 
so, we find some significant differences from published figures 
and suggest that this has salience for post-Brexit funding.
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1.4 EXISTING MEASURES – GDP AND GVA
Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (and its sister meas-
ure GVA per capita) has come to be widely used by academics 
and policy makers as a crude proxy for both living stand-
ards and economic performance. It has been widely criticised, 
not least because it ignores environmental degradation and 
resource use (Dasgupta, 2008). If used as a measure of wel-
fare, GDP is not value free: it assumes that an additional £1 
of income is worth the same whether it accrues to a multi-mil-
lionaire or someone who is starving. Nevertheless it remains 
widely used, in part because it is a well-defined measure and 
is highly correlated with other measures of wellbeing and 
progress (e.g. the human development index). Indeed, some 
have even argued that GDP per capita is a better measure of 
happiness than most alternatives (Dipietro & Anoruo, 2006), 
although this is far from a majority view.
GVA (formerly known as GDP at basic prices), is equal to 
GDP but excludes taxes and subsidies. In spite of its prob-
lems, regional GVA per capita remains used in the policy 
community. The first part of this book draws upon the work 
of the ONS (Dunnell, 2009) and Gripaios and Bishop (2006), 
amongst others, arguing that GVA per capita is not a suitable 
measure of either regional productivity or regional wellbeing. 
The second part of the book develops official figures (includ-
ing both regional GVA and regional gross disposable house-
hold income (GDHI) by assessing how subnational variations 
in purchasing power affect them. It investigates how this 
alters our perspective on relative regional performance. All 
of this has direct policy relevance for regional and national 
policy makers, particularly in light of Brexit.
Areas with GVA per capita of below 90% of the EU aver-
age are eligible for higher levels of funding from the EU’s 
structural funds than those above this threshold (Department 
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for Communities and Local Government, 2014). In the UK, 
this includes a total of 13 regions (including Shropshire & 
Staffordshire in the West Midlands). Moreover, the present 
devolution agenda has meant that a number of local bodies 
have used GVA per capita as a yardstick against which they 
should be judged. As such, several LEPs have used it as a key 
performance metric in recent years (Greater Birmingham and 
Solihull Local Enterprise Partnership, 2016; Leicester and 
Leicestershire Local Economic Partnership, 2014).
Similarly, the West Midlands Combined Authority 
(WMCA) uses GVA in its vision for 2030 – aiming for GVA 
per head of 5% above the national average. Indeed, the 
WMCA strategic economic plan explicitly states, ‘increased 
GVA provides evidence for real growth in the West Midlands’ 
economy’ (WMCA, 2016). GVA per capita was quoted in the 
Government’s Industrial Strategy Green Paper as a measure 
of productivity and thus as justification for the ‘essential’ pro-
cess of rebalancing growth across the country (Department 
for Business Energy & Industrial Strategy, 2017).
In the academic literature, spatial imbalances in the UK 
economy are widely commented on (Gardiner, Martin, Sun-
ley, & Tyler, 2013; Martin, Pike, Tyler, & Gardiner, 2016; 
Rice & Venables, 2003), particularly in the fields of economic 
geography and regional studies. Even within the academic 
community, GVA per capita continues to be used as a short-
hand for regional economic performance (see e.g. Huggins & 
Thompson, 2017; Ivanov & Webster, 2007; Lee, 2017).
1.5 COMMUTING AND ITS IMPACT
Whatever its merits and demerits as a statistic when applied 
nationwide, GVA per capita is not well suited to regional 
analysis, particularly for geographically small regions. For 
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this reason, the ONS explicitly counsels against using GVA 
per capita (Dunnell, 2009). To see why, note that it divides 
the amount produced by those working in an area by the 
number of people living in an area. For somewhere like the 
UK with large flows of commuters, this can produce a seri-
ously biased picture.
A clear example of this relates to the comparison of strong-
ly remain-voting Tower Hamlets in London and leave-voting 
Essex Thames Gateway (home to Basildon, Castle Point and 
Rochford). The former enjoys a GVA per capita almost 350% 
of the national average compared to the latter at just 72%. 
A superficial examination might, on this basis, suggest a rela-
tionship between incomes and the vote for Brexit. However, 
careful reflection of the data suggests that this might not be 
the case: residents in Tower Hamlets are only 18% better off 
than their counterparts in Essex Thames Gateway, suggesting 
that this effect is primarily due to commuter flows.
This objection is not new: for over a decade, researchers 
have noted that commuter flows seriously impact GVA meas-
ures, particularly in London (Roberts, 2004). It is this that 
leads to GVA per capita in Westminster to be almost 800% 
above the UK average. In fact, GVA per capita is higher in 
Islington (represented by the constituencies of Jeremy Cor-
byn and Emily Thornberry) than in Kensington and Chelsea. 
Taken to its extreme, GVA per capita in the City of Lon-
don is £5.2 million (with a population of circa 8,000 and 
a workforce of some 483,000). Previously measures of so-
called ‘residence-based GVA’ were produced (ONS, 2017g). 
This attempted to allocate that portion of GVA attributable 
to wage earners to their region of residence rather than their 
region of work. The calculation as it stood led to regional 
output being apportioned on the basis of neither residency 
nor workplace but some conceptually unclear hybrid measure 
of the two. As a result, it is no longer produced by the ONS.
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An obvious corollary of this is that these distortions have 
a real impact on EU funding flows. GVA per capita in parts 
of Outer London is far below the national average as a large 
number of residents commute into Inner London each day. 
Perversely, therefore, were EU structural funding to be reas-
sessed now, some of the wealthiest parts of Europe (North and 
East London) would receive higher levels of structural fund-
ing than other (much poorer) regions. An attenuated version 
of this phenomenon is visible in the West Midlands: one of 
the reasons Shropshire and Staffordshire have such low GVA 
per capita is due to an outflow of commuters into the metro-
politan area (and to a much lesser extent north into Cheshire). 
The UK’s exit from the EU potentially provides an opportunity 
to reassess some of these funding flows to ensure that they are 
targeted at the places (and people) that need them most.
1.6 DEMOGRAPHICS AND THE LABOUR MARKET
Demographic factors can also have a notable effect on any 
figures compiled on a per-capita basis. Most obviously, eco-
nomic output is generated by those in work. The presence 
of children and the retired in an area will thus increase the 
denominator without affecting the numerator. This will be 
true even if they carry out activity that is socially useful, for 
example, volunteering, that is, not captured by official eco-
nomic statistics.
Part of the confusion comes about because this is an 
acceptable practice on a national level. Germany and Japan, 
for example, struggle with rapidly ageing populations and 
pensions need to be paid by those still working. This may 
take the form of the return on assets acquired over a work-
ing lifetime or direct transfers but, in either case, effective-
ly entails a transfer from the employed to the retired (Barr, 
13Defining the Problem
2002).  Crucially, in the absence of a large net balance of for-
eign assets, most of this transfer comes within countries.
In contrast, on a regional basis, it is possible (indeed nor-
mal) for transfers to take place between regions. The Govern-
ment may choose to tax workers in London in order to pay 
the pensions of those living in the South West. Alternatively, the 
workforce may use part of their income to purchase assets (a 
house, future pension investments, etc.) from those retirees who 
are moving to the South West. In either event, this involves a 
transfer of resources produced in London to be consumed in 
the South West. This process is both normal and healthy, but it 
has the effect of flattering the figures for London and depress-
ing those for the South West. As such, whilst it is not true that 
GVA ‘excludes’ certain categories of income such as pensions as 
argued by Gripaios and Bishop (2006), it does measure econom-
ic output where it is generated rather than where the income 
flows to and is thus not a reliable measure of regional welfare.
This effect is quantitatively significant: London has a con-
siderably higher proportion of its population of working age 
than other parts of the country. Similar effects are visible in 
other cities. Moreover, this effect has intensified over the past 
two decades, accounting for a non-trivial portion of the grow-
ing disparity between London and the rest of the UK. In 1997, 
for example, 66.2% of London’s population was of working 
age, compared to 62% in the South West. By 2016, these fig-
ures had diverged to 67.9% and 60.9%, respectively. This has 
a non-trivial impact: it accounts for 17.8% of the disparity in 
GVA per head between these two regions (authors’ calcula-
tions based on ONS, 2017f, 2018a).
Even accounting for these factors, however, important 
facets of labour market performance have a distinct impact 
on GVA. Lower employment in an area will, ceteris paribus, 
depress regional GVA. What’s less clear, however, is the extent 
to which this can be mitigated and whether attempting to do 
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so is a desirable policy option. By definition, those who are 
not employed are not generating measured economic output 
(although they are almost certainly generating unmeasured 
economic output – childcare, for example). GVA is affected by 
both employment and productivity, which may partly explain 
its popularity. As shown previously, employment can also 
vary due to demographic factors as well as due to commuting.
Whilst there is almost universal agreement that high unem-
ployment rates are undesirable, GVA per capita is virtually 
uncorrelated with unemployment,1 although there does appear 
to be some relationship between GVA growth and unemploy-
ment rates (see Revoredo-Giha, Leat, & Renwick, 2012, in 
relation to Scotland; and Kangasharju, Tavera, and Nijkamp, 
2012, for evidence from Finland). Tower Hamlets, for exam-
ple, enjoyed both the fourth-highest GVA per capita of any 
local authority and had the joint highest unemployment rate of 
any local authority. Whilst the boroughs of Inner London are 
undoubtedly somewhat exceptional in this regard, the more 
general point stands: on a subregional level, GVA per capita 
relates poorly to several macroeconomic variables of interest.
More broadly, unemployment today represents just a small 
fraction of the total number of working-age individuals who 
are not employed. Part of this is relatively easy to correct for: 
official statistics view the working age population as being 
between 16 and 65 even though it is now a legal requirement 
for those aged between 16 and 18 in England to remain in edu-
cation or undertake training. Whilst, in theory, it is possible to 
begin an apprenticeship (or work at least 20 hours per week if 
one is in part-time education), the scarcity of places means that 
most continue in full-time education until 18 or 19.
The presence of a large university student population can 
have a very similar effect on an area as many students choose 
not to work (or work very few hours). This may be one reason 
why Oxford, for example, has a GVA per capita below that 
of Milton Keynes (although both are well above the national 
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average). At the other end of the scale, early retirement, whilst 
not as prominent as it once was, has a very substantial effect 
on employment amongst those aged over 50. In truth, there-
fore, these are demographic factors impacting on employment 
masquerading under the guise of ‘economic inactivity’. Whilst 
they constitute another reason not to use GVA per capita as a 
measure of economic performance, they also have important 
consequences for welfare that we shall return to.
All of these issues take on additional salience in light of 
the vote to leave the EU. In particular, the use of alternative 
metrics (including those we highlight below) to direct fund-
ing flows should be considered. Indeed, it is arguable that 
use of existing measures has been one of several factors that 
might have driven some of the imbalances in regional spend-
ing identified in  Chapter 4. As such, there are notable policy 
ramifications that the UK should consider, especially in light 
of the vote to leave the EU, whatever form the UK’s future 
relationship with that body takes.
1.7 TOWARDS A BETTER MEASURE: GDHI PER CAPITA 
AND GVA PER WORKER
GVA per capita is therefore a poor measure of regional eco-
nomic performance. In light of this, we urge that greater 
attention be paid to two alternatives: GVA per hour worked 
and GDHI per capita. The first of these is a measure of pro-
ductivity and the second measures household incomes (the 
relevant metric for assessing regional welfare, at least on a 
monetary basis; a full definition is given in Appendix 1). We 
believe that this is a better solution than merely reshaping 
the relevant statistical areas, although the broader argument 
that statistical areas should take account of the underlying 
economic geography of an area as argued by Gripaios and 
Bishop (2006) remains valid.
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Crucially, these two measures maintain the distinction 
between those who work in an area and those who live in the 
area. As such, GVA per hour worked measures the amount 
produced by each member of the workforce per hour in a 
given region. In practical terms, it gives similar results to 
GVA per worker but accounts for the fact that hours worked 
vary across regions (Londoners in particular work slightly 
longer hours than those living elsewhere). Nevertheless, 
total hours worked can be difficult to measure accurately, 
particularly in cases where unpaid overtime is common. As 
a result, regional GVA per hour worked (which is reported 
by the ONS) can be somewhat erratic: smoothing the series 
(e.g. by taking a moving average) is likely to ameliorate this 
somewhat.
The effect of this is dramatic: pushed up by net-inflows 
of commuters, a long-hours culture and a high working age 
population, London’s GVA per capita is 76.5% higher than 
the national average. Its labour productivity, as measured by 
its GVA per hour worked (ONS, 2018e), however, is only 
33.3% above the national average. The same is true in reverse 
for other regions: Yorkshire moves from being 21.5% below 
the UK average to 15.2% below. It is therefore positive that a 
number of LEPs are now using GVA per worker or GVA per 
hour as a more effective measure of economic performance 
(Greater Birmingham and Solihull Local Enterprise Partner-
ship, 2018; North East Local Enterprise Partnership, 2018).
Fig. 1 gives a sense of the magnitude of the distortion. 
Whilst GVA per capita fails to measure either productivity 
or living standards, GVA per hour is a measure of the former 
whilst GDHI per capita is a measure of the latter. Although 
London stands out as a region where such distortions are par-
ticularly prevalent, very noticeable differences between GVA 
per capita and the other measures also appear in Wales and 
the North East of England.
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The fact that these figures do not take into account differ-
ences in prices across regions, together with the difficulty of 
measuring the size of the financial services and real estate sec-
tors mean that official figures can reasonably be assumed to 
be an upper bound on regional productivity disparities. The 
fundamental methodological issue at play here (the absence 
of subnational price parities) is not unique to the UK – indeed 
there is an emerging literature on the subject. As such, over 
the past 20 years a variety of attempts have been made in a 
number of countries to calculate regional price levels. Due to 
data limitations these have often been partial but a nascent 
research agenda is, in fact, developing on the subject.
As in a number of areas regarding economic and social 
statistics, the United States is in the vanguard of these devel-
opments with an official price index and attempts to deflate 
regional earnings (Aten, Figueroa, Mbu, & Vengelen, 2017). 
The Australian Bureau of Statistics produced an experimental 
set of spatial price indices (Waschka, Milne, Khoo, Quirey, 
& Zhao, 2003) although like the work of the ONS, these 
excluded housing costs (ONS, 2011, 2018g). The methodo-
logical approach of the Australian work was broadly similar 
to that of the ONS’ later works (although not earlier attempts 
Fig. 1. Comparative Economic Performance.
Source: ONS (2017f, 2018e, 2018f).
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to compare regional prices (Ball & Fenwick, 2004; Wingfield, 
Fenwick, & Smith, 2005) and our own, with the exception of 
excluding housing costs.
There have been several pieces of work considering region-
al price differences within China (Gong & Meng, 2008; Jiang 
& Li, 2006; Li & Gibson, 2014), although some more recent 
work has suggested that the ‘Law of One Price’ holds for some 
regions (Liu, Su, Chang, & Xiong, 2018). Within Europe work 
has been somewhat more limited, although there have been a 
number of promising studies with regard to Czechia (see e.g. 
Cadil, Mazouch, Musil, & Kramulova, 2014), whilst Roos 
(2006) used an econometric model to estimate regional prices 
in Germany, showing that East–West differentials are reduced 
when price differences are accounted for. In Italy, there is now 
official interest in calculating subnational purchasing power 
parities (Biggeri, Laureti, & Polidoro, 2017).
The following chapters are devoted to a discussion of these 
issues in the UK case and, critically, how new estimates can be 
used to better understand regional disparities. These regional 
disparities are the context within which the vote to leave the 
EU occurred. The Brexit vote did not cause these fissures, but 
it has exposed them and, if inappropriate policies are pursued, 
threatens to exaggerate them (Los et al., 2017). As such, a full-
er understanding is needed of those regions that have been ‘left 
behind’ and this book is a contribution to that wider debate.
NOTE
1. At NUTS2 level, the correlation between Jan. and Dec. 
unemployment rate, as measured by the Annual Population Survey 
(ONS, 2017a) and GVA per capita, as measured by the Regional 
Accounts (ONS, 2017f) was −0.01 in 2016.
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THINKING OUTSIDE THE BOX 
(PART 1): REAL LIVING STANDARDS
2.1 OVERVIEW
When comparing regional living standards, we’re typically 
most interested in the welfare of residents of an area (rath-
er than its workforce). This chapter discusses the preferred 
welfare measure of many in the Office for National Statistics 
(ONS) (Dunnell, 2009) – gross disposable household income 
(GDHI) – before touching on a measure of deprivation, name-
ly the Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD). This has critical 
salience for those ‘left-behind’ (Goodwin & Heath, 2016) 
in the ‘places that don’t matter’ who voted most strongly 
to leave the European Union (EU) (Rodríguez-Pose, 2018). 
The chapter is structured as follows:
•	 Introduction – This section gives a brief discussion 
of GDHI per capita, its component parts and the 
regionalisation process adopted by the ONS.
•	 Price levels – Here we introduce a more detailed 
discussion of the primary weakness of the GDHI measure: 
its failure to account for different living costs across 
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regions. We draw on the latest data to develop and 
appropriate correction for this and demonstrate its impact.
•	 Operating surplus – This addresses a further relatively 
minor technical issue in the regionalisation process used 
to account for imputed rent.
•	 Inequality – GDHI takes no account of inequality and this 
section discusses the possible scale of the issue.
•	 IMD – Here we briefly discuss the IMD, noting its 
advantages and disadvantages, and show that it requires 
similar corrections to GDHI in order to take account 
differences in the cost of living across Britain.
2.2 INTRODUCTION
GDHI per capita is a measure of average regional living 
standards. It includes household income from all sources and, 
unlike GVA, is calculated on the basis of residency. Thus, if 
a pensioner living in Devon receives investment income that 
is ultimately generated by profits from a company in London 
then it is counted as disposable income in the South West. As 
such, it is a superior measure of average living standards, but 
should not be used to measure productivity, regional output 
or to describe the economic geography of an area.
GDHI is defined by the ONS as being ‘the amount of 
money that individuals in the household sector have available 
for spending or saving […] after expenditure associated with 
income, for example taxes and social contributions’ (West 
et al., 2016, p. 34). The regional GDHI figures published by 
the ONS are compiled on a ‘top-down’ basis. In practical 
terms, this means that the ONS begins with national aggre-
gates for each component part of GDHI and then uses a vari-
ety of indicators to apportion them in turn to each region.
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GDHI does not map neatly to the ‘cash income’ of indi-
viduals as it includes implicit income, such as the implicit rent 
earned by owner–occupiers. In fact, this is a strength rather 
than a weakness – the fact that no money physically changes 
hands should not blind us to the fact that owner–occupiers 
receive ‘income’ in the form of not having to pay rent. In 
effect, they pay rent to themselves. A further major strength 
of GDHI per capita is that, unlike measures of deprivation, it 
includes the entire population in its scope. Whilst attention is 
rightly focussed on the very poor, a true measure of overall 
regional welfare should include those ‘just about managing’ 
(Parkinson, 2016), the middle classes and the well-off. Indeed, 
Sayer (2017) sees the focus on income and the ‘left behind’ as 
overdone (although the evidence of Becker, Fetzer, & Novy, 
2017) seems to contradict this.
GDHI does have major weaknesses. Firstly, like gross 
domestic product per capita, it tells us nothing about inequal-
ity. Most importantly of all, it measures income in purely 
nominal terms. Whilst it may appear sensible to measure 
income in terms of pounds and pence, the reality is that the 
cost of living varies enormously across regions. In many ways 
this is intuitively obvious: anyone who has spent time in both 
London and other parts of the country will be well aware of 
how much further your money goes in the latter. A classic 
example of this is the cost of an average pint of beer – in Lon-
don this is £4.20, whereas in Herefordshire it’s just £3.31.1
2.3 PRICE LEVELS
An accurate measure of regional living standards must adjust 
for these differences in regional price levels. In this chapter, we 
build on the methodology introduced in Hearne (Forthcom-
ing-b) and use the very latest data to show that accounting 
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for different regional price levels more than halves the dis-
parity between London and Yorkshire in 2016. This has very 
obvious ramifications for regional policy and particularly for 
post-Brexit funding flows. It also refines our existing percep-
tions of the UK’s ‘regional problem’ (Hardill, Benneworth, 
Baker, & Budd, 2006) and spatial imbalances and suggests 
both challenges to, and further scope to develop, the Govern-
ment’s ‘Northern Powerhouse’, ‘Midlands Engine’ and ‘Indus-
trial Strategy’ agendas.
Interestingly, whilst the UK practice of using nominal data 
is standard within Europe, it is by no means universal inter-
nationally. The Bureau of Economic Analysis in the United 
States, for example, publishes estimates of regional price 
parities and finds that prices in the state of New York are 
34% higher than those of Mississippi. The effects are dra-
matic: instead of New Yorkers being 69% better off than 
Mississippians, in real terms the gap is a less extreme 26% 
(Aten, Figueroa, Mbu, & Vengelen, 2017). Our work seeks 
to develop figures for the UK in line with this international 
best practice.
The pattern of areas with high nominal incomes also expe-
riencing higher than average price levels is well established, 
particularly within the academic literature on international 
economics (see Asea & Corden, 1994, for an overview). There 
is growing evidence that the same is true on a regional level, 
with examples as diverse as Italy (Nenna, 2001) and China 
(Jiang & Li, 2006), amongst others. It’s thus likely, prima facie, 
that the same is true within the UK. There is now a mature, 
high quality academic literature investigating regional differ-
ences and inequalities both within the UK and internation-
ally (see McCann, 2016, for an in-depth treatment of the UK 
case, work from Beugelsdijk, Klasing, & Milionis, 2018, for 
an example of the Europe-wide debate and Lemoine, Poncet, 
& Ünal, 2015, for a discussion of the Chinese case).
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Nevertheless, in spite of its importance, only a modest por-
tion of this work has focussed on regional prices. This has not 
been lost on many observers: as Blien, Gartner, Stüber, and 
Wolf (2009, p. 17) note, ‘[T]hough the value of information 
on regional prices is obvious, there is a lack of empirical data 
in many countries’. Official interest in regional prices in the 
UK initially surfaced in the 1960s (Retail Prices Index Advi-
sory Committee, 1971), but little was done. In fact, only with 
the advent of Eurostat’s need for Spatial Adjustment Factors 
did official attention return to the matter.
In the interim, and particularly during the 1990s, academ-
ic attention was paid to the development of regional price 
indices. Regional prices diverged significantly over the course 
of the 1980s (Borooah, McGregor, McKee, & Mulholland, 
1996), and this had a noteworthy effect on the spatial distri-
bution real wages for both manual and non-manual work-
ers (Martin & Tyler, 1994). Indeed, Johnston, McKinney, and 
Stark (1996) found that the cost of living in London went 
from being 5% greater than the UK average to 7.5% between 
the beginning and end of the 1980s. Hayes (2005) attempted 
to create a pure ‘price index’ and found that from 1979 to 
1996, inflation across regions was highly correlated but that 
there was some regional heterogeneity.
All of these authors made use of the regional price data col-
lected by the Croner-Reward Cost of Living Surveys, which 
were the only data available on regional prices during the 
period in question. Today, we have the luxury of using offi-
cial data, which whilst only collected every six years do have 
considerably larger sample sizes. The Croner-Reward data in 
question were discontinued and all the academic articles in 
question refer to prices in the mid-1990s or earlier.
A second change over the past two decades is methodo-
logical. Much previous work (see e.g Borooah et al., 1996; 
Rienzo, 2017) drew on the methodology used by the retail 
24 Regional Success After Brexit
price index (RPI), which was at the time the gold standard 
measure of inflation in the UK. Today, the ONS has moved 
away from using the RPI as new, internationally comparable, 
measures of inflation have been developed which incorporate 
the latest developments and techniques.
Deciding on the most appropriate method to compare 
prices across regions is unfortunately not as straightforward 
as it might at first appear. This is primarily due to the fact that 
not all prices differ by the same amount: the cost of broad-
band is broadly similar in London or Newcastle, but the cost 
of putting a roof over one’s head definitely isn’t. Londoners 
typically spend a greater proportion of their income on hous-
ing and live in smaller properties than those in the North East. 
This problem is compounded by the fact that consumption 
patterns can differ across regions. For example, the presence 
of a high quality mass transit network in London combined 
with high levels of congestion means that transport spending 
differs in both amount and composition (ONS, 2017d).
We use the same methodology and data sources outlined 
in Hearne (Forthcoming-b). Since that work, however, the 
ONS have released relative regional consumer price levels 
(RRCPLs) for 2016 allowing us to provide an up-to-date 
assessment of relative regional living standards. The 2016 
ONS RRCPLs are used as the base for our calculations. The 
ONS do not include housing costs in the RRCPLs, so our 
work needs to appropriately incorporate housing costs in 
order to assess the true cost of living in each region.
Additionally, as outlined in Hearne (Forthcoming-b), our 
figures are compiled on the basis of the spending of residents 
of a region, whereas the ONS’ RRCPLs are compiled on the 
basis of what is spent in a region rather than on the basis of 
what is spent by residents of a region. As a result, they do not 
include money spent by residents outside of the region but 
they do include that spent by non-residents inside the region 
(e.g. by tourists). Whilst this is conceptually correct for their 
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purposes, it is not appropriate for assessing living standards. 
As a result, we adjust for both factors.
As in 2010, a detailed breakdown of regional prices is not 
available at the division level (ONS, 2011). Two options are 
available at this point in order to operationalise our calcula-
tion of relative regional prices. The first is to assume that pric-
es for all goods except housing are identical in English regions 
outside London (allowing one to use the detailed breakdowns 
available for Scotland, Wales, London and ‘Rest of England’). 
The second alternative is to use the aggregated figures avail-
able by region, but accept that division-level results are not 
available. As non-housing costs inside England (excluding 
the capital) appear to differ by over 5% the second approach 
seems the most sensible.
We therefore break up each region’s total spending into 
five constituent parts:
(1)  Expenditure categories accounted for by the RRCPLs 
(this represented the majority of total consumer 
spending in every region – typically around 65%).
(2)  Expenditure on things whose prices were assumed not 
to vary across regions (primarily holiday expenditure).
(3)  Expenditure on privately rented housing.
(4)  Expenditure on socially rented housing.
(5)  Owner occupiers housing costs.
Health and (private) education spending by consumers fell 
into the second category – prescription charges are uniform 
across England and prices for items such as glasses and con-
tact lenses are unlikely to vary much. In the absence of any 
further data, private education and health care is assumed to 
be equally costly irrespective of location. This is unlikely to 
have a major effect on the total price index as both items com-
bined account for around 2.5% of total spending in the UK.
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Two main data sources are used. The living costs and food 
(LCF) survey is used to ascertain what proportion of total 
spending is accounted for by each category.2 In order to do 
so, two transformations are needed. The LCF survey gives an 
inventory of average total expenditure per household in each 
region. Unfortunately, not all forms of expenditure are rele-
vant for the calculation of price levels. As a result, we exclude 
those things that are not relevant to a price index (specifically, 
mortgage interest payments, savings and cash transfers and 
gifts). Similarly, the housing services enjoyed by owner–occu-
piers are implicit rather than explicit.
This is important: estimates of incomes and price levels 
need to be constructed on a systematic and consistent basis. 
In order to do so, it is necessary to distinguish the cost of put-
ting a roof over one’s head (what we’re interested in) from the 
cost of buying a house as an asset. In essence, we need to split 
the ‘owner’ from the ‘occupier’. The conceptually correct way 
to do this is as follows: the occupant pays rent to the owner. 
As both are the same person in this case no money actually 
changes hands – the transaction is implicit.
From the perspective of the occupant, the implicit rent paid 
can be thought of as the true cost of putting a roof over one’s 
head. As this is a service, it needs to be included in any meas-
ure of the cost of living. From the perspective of the owner, 
the rent received is part of the return earned from owning the 
asset (i.e. the property). This can be thought of as similar to 
the dividend from a share or coupon on a bond.3 The remain-
der of the return is the capital gain or loss realised upon the 
sale of the property.
How much should this ‘implicit’ rental payment actually 
be? The obvious solution is also the correct one: the price of 
renting an identical property on the private market. Whilst, in 
practical terms, this is likely to be almost impossible for certain 
types of properties in some areas (e.g. the rental market for 
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four bedroom houses in most areas is rather thin), when com-
paring across larger regions this does not present a problem.
The proportion of total expenditure accounted for by 
imputed rents can be estimated by multiplying total spending 
on gross rents in the LCF survey by:
÷Proportion of owner occupiers in region   
Proportion of renters in region
The proportion of owner–occupiers by region can be 
ascertained from the Family Resources Survey (FRS). This 
also allows one to break down rents into the private and 
social renting sectors. The FRS was also used to estimate rela-
tive rental prices for both sectors (private and social rents). 
Private rents are the appropriate yardstick to use for the cost 
of owner-occupied housing.
2.4 OPERATING SURPLUS
One additional, relatively minor, issue relates to the method 
used by the ONS for apportioning imputed rents. Gross oper-
ating surplus represents around 10% of primary resources 
in the UK as a whole (typically rather more in London and 
the South East) and ‘relates to the household sector’s rental 
income from buildings, including the imputed rental of own-
er–occupier dwellings’ (West et al., 2016, p. 36).
As noted previously, regional GDHI is calculated on a 
top-down basis by allocating a proportion of each national 
component (operating surplus, mixed income, compensation 
of employees, etc.) to regions and then summing them. As 
the ONS points out, ‘[t]he national operating surplus total 
is regionalised using estimates of median property prices by 
region’. This approach implicitly assumes that regional rents 
are perfectly correlated with median regional property prices.
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In theory this should be the case: property is an asset and 
if the returns on that asset are greater in one region than in 
another then there is a clear incentive to purchase property in 
the region which offers greater returns. Several factors, how-
ever, suggest that this may not be the case in practice. Firstly, 
rents from a property form only part of the expected returns – 
they are the running yield, with the remainder of the expected 
returns accounted for by anticipated capital appreciation. 
This speculation appears to have played a significant part in 
divergent trends in property prices in recent years.
Secondly, imperfections in capital markets and frictions 
associated with buying and selling property may mean 
that any equilibrating forces act only slowly. Experimen-
tal statistics from the ONS suggest that house prices have 
diverged to a much greater extent than rents since 2010. In 
particular, between January 2011 and January 2018, rents 
in the North East increased by 4.3% compared to 23% in 
London (ONS, 2018c). In contrast, house prices increased 
by 5.1% in the North East and 69% in London over the 
same period (ONS, 2018h).
As a result, using house prices rather than rents will lead to 
GDHI overstating improvements in living standards in London 
relative to those in the North East. Whilst the effects are modest 
relative to the changes induced by accounting for price differ-
ences, they compress the gap between London and the North 
still further. After recalculating the figures using the relative 
rents in the FRS, we find that Londoners are only 20% better off 
than their counterparts in the North East and those in the South 
East around 16% better off than the inhabitants of Yorkshire.
Naturally, the FRS is not an infallible data source either: sam-
ple sizes are relatively small and relative regional rents vary sub-
stantially from year to year. Moreover, data from the Valuations 
Office Agency (2017) and Unison (2017) suggest that regional 
disparities in rents are significantly greater than the FRS would 
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indicate. As a result we are faced with an alternative – the ‘Oper-
ating Surplus’ portion of GDHI contains an implicit measure of 
relative regional housing costs. If we follow the regionalisation 
procedure outlined by the ONS (West et al., 2016) in reverse (by 
using data on housing stock by region) then we can calculate the 
relative regional housing costs implied by the GDHI.
2.5 THE RESULTS
This completes work to find a set of appropriate expenditure 
weights for each region. We can then use the relative pric-
es provided by the FRS or those ‘back calculated’ from the 
GDHI for housing costs and the RRCPLs for everything else. 
The Èltetö-Köves-Szulc procedure (explained in greater depth 
in Appendix 2) can then be used to calculate relative prices, 
based upon the five categories.4 Whilst in theory the slightly 
different aggregation procedure we use relative to the OECD 
(as a result of data limitations) could have an impact on the 
price levels we calculate, in practice the difference is likely to 
be tiny (and in all probability dwarfed by measurement error 
in the ONS surveys used).
Fig. 2. Estimated Regional Consumer Price Levels.
Source: authors’ calculations.
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As can be seen in Fig. 2, whilst the choice of measure for 
housing costs does indeed make a difference, the overall pat-
tern of results is clear in either case. London is, by far, the most 
expensive region in the UK in which to live. This is followed 
by other southern parts of the UK with the northern regions 
of England and Wales proving to be the cheapest parts of the 
country to live. This fits rather well with common perceptions 
of prices in different parts of the country.
2.6 REAL REGIONAL GDHI
The next graph (Fig. 3) shows the impact of regional price 
variations on household incomes across Great Britain. ‘Meth-
od 1’ in the graph refers to using the FRS data on housing 
costs but re-allocating households operating surplus across 
regions on this basis of these. ‘Method 2’ uses the nominal 
regional GDHI figures as-is but the deflator uses the estimates 
of housing-costs derived directly from the GDHI itself. Both 
figures ultimately deliver extremely close results.
The principal impact is to greatly narrow the divide between 
North and South. The impact on London is particularly strik-
ing: the average Londoner falls from being 71% better off 
than their Welsh counterpart to being ‘only’ 27% better off. 
Whilst this remains a substantial difference, it is not the verita-
ble chasm that official data make it look. Moreover, although 
London is an outlier, an attenuated version of the same phe-
nomenon is visible across the UK: the gap between Yorkshire 
and the South East falls from 37% to 19%, for example.
Moreover, this analysis alters the ranking of regions within 
the UK. The North East, Yorkshire & Humberside and Wales 
all overtake the West Midlands due to their lower cost of 
living. Scotland appears as well off as the ‘East of England’ 
(comprising Hertfordshire, Essex and Bedfordshire as well as 
East Anglia) and at least as well off as the South West.
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The same fundamental point will apply to any regional 
data regarding incomes. Wages are proportionately affected, 
for example. Moreover, the phenomenon is equally visible at 
the level of urban subregions. If we assume that price levels 
differ across regions but are broadly constant within them,5 
then some indicative comparisons are possible. In Fig.  4 
below, we consider the case of the Combined Authorities 
(plus London). As can be seen, the broad pattern exhibited 
by the nominal data remains unchanged, although the gaps 
between regions are smaller. The clear exception to this rule 
is the West Midlands, which falls further behind its peers 
as the poorest Combined Authority in the UK. Again, this 
is interesting in light of the Brexit vote – a number of local 
authorities in this area had an exceptionally large vote in 
favour of leaving the EU. The other notable feature is that 
London stands out far less: this is particularly true when 
one considers that London itself contains a handful of 
standout boroughs (most notably Kensington & Chelsea, 
Hammersmith & Fulham, Westminster, the City of London 
& Camden) that drive its anomalous performance.
Fig. 3. Real Regional Incomes in the UK.
Sources: Nominal Gross Disposable Household Income 
(ONS, 2018f). Real Gross Disposable Household Income 
(authors’ calculations – both methods).
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2.7 INEQUALITY
As GDHI is based upon mean incomes, it can be skewed by 
a relatively small number of extremely high earners. Similar 
issues clearly arise in the case where wealth is concentrated or 
where there is an unusually wide spread of rents in the prop-
erty market. It should be noted that this only poses a problem 
for regional analysis when there are marked differences in 
structure between regions. In practical terms, this effect is vis-
ible but only in London, the South East and East of England.
The single largest contributor to GDHI is wages and sal-
aries, with employers’ social contributions also likely to be 
broadly proportional to these. High quality data in the form 
of the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) (ONS, 
2017b) exist on both mean and median wages in the UK. 
Considering the delta between these can give a crude measure 
of the impact of extremely high earners on average earnings. 
In all regions outside the Greater South East, median full-time 
earnings are between 83% and 87% of mean full-time earn-
ings. These figures are 80.3%, 80.2% and 76.4% for the East 
of England, the South East and London, respectively.
Fig. 4. GDHI Per Capita in Combined Authorities (UK = 100).
Sources: (ONS, 2018f) and authors’ calculation as specified.
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In fact, if one uses the upper-bound price levels calculated 
previously and the ASHE dataset, median real full-time wages 
of Londoners are the second-lowest in the UK (after the South 
West). By this measure, there is no North–South divide in the 
UK. In fact, regional differences in median full-time earnings 
almost vanish and there is very little geographical pattern 
to them. Mean wages are, of course, another matter entirely 
since they are skewed by the earnings of the very wealthy 
and it is here that the traditional North–South divide reas-
serts itself.
This implies that it is the wages of those towards the top of 
the income distribution that show notable divergence between 
regions. For those on low or medium incomes (around 75% of 
the population), the difference in regional incomes is approxi-
mately equal to the difference in prices. Indeed, tentative 
evidence suggests that 99th percentile wages for employees 
working in London are 6.9 times median wages, compared 
to just 4.7 times in the rest of the country (ONS, 2016b). The 
upshot of this is that there is no systematic wage incentive 
for workers around the middle of the income distribution to 
relocate, which accords with what economic theory would 
predict.
Meanwhile, non-wage income (particularly from prop-
erty) is considerably higher in the South of England than 
elsewhere, reflecting the concentration of wealth in that area. 
Analysis suggests that the spread in rents (which determine 
the imputed housing services ascribed to owner–occupiers) is 
much greater in London and the South East than elsewhere. 
Median rents are over 90% of mean rents in every region out-
side the Greater South East (in London the equivalent figure 
is 85.5% according to the Valuation Office Agency, 2018). 
To the extent that income of the bottom 80% (or even 90%) 
of the population distribution might be considered a better 
measure of aggregate welfare, it may be worth seeking to 
develop ways in which to take this into account.
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One additional issue that regional policy makers may face 
when using GDHI is that it measures income after taxes and 
benefits have been paid. As a measure of the income that peo-
ple ultimately have to spend, this is conceptually the correct 
thing to do. Many regional policy makers, however, may be 
interested in income before Government intervention. This is 
also reported by the ONS in the GDHI statistics, albeit under 
the guise of ‘primary income’ (in both cases, per capita meas-
urements should be used). When comparing tax and spend-
ing policies, the nominal data (as published) should be used, 
whereas if one is interested in assessing real incomes (exclud-
ing taxes and benefits) then an adjustment needs to be made 
for differing relative consumer price levels.
2.8 THE INDEX OF MULTIPLE DEPRIVATION
The prospect of Brexit may afford the opportunity to move 
away from traditional funding formulae based upon GVA 
per capita. One alternative measure that has attracted atten-
tion from policy makers in the local government sphere is 
the IMD. This official statistic acknowledges that there are 
multiple facets of deprivation and has been produced for 
England (Ministry of Housing Communities & Local Gov-
ernment, 2015), Scotland (Scottish Government, 2016) and 
Wales (Welsh Government, 2015). A similar index is also 
produced by the Northern Ireland Statistics and Research 
Agency (2017). This official statistic has been used as a meas-
ure of deprivation by recent work on well-being (Abreu, 
Oner, Brouwer, & van Leeuwen, 2018). The IMD focusses 
particularly heavily on identifying areas where deprivation 
is particularly heavily concentrated. Whilst this might be 
considered a strength, it also poses certain challenges for 
regional policy makers.
35Real Living Standards
Firstly, it only focusses on a subset of the total community. 
This is both a strength and a weakness – there is clearly value 
in considering the most deprived households. It is important 
to identify those areas where deprivation is particularly con-
centrated. Nevertheless, it does not necessarily allow us to 
identify the extent to which deprivation is due to inter-area 
inequality (in which case the focus is rightly on spatial dis-
parities) as opposed to intra-area inequality (as is the case in 
certain parts of London).
Moreover, the presence of deprived communities does not 
necessarily indicate weakness or absence of opportunity in 
the regional economy. Tower Hamlets remains one of the 
most deprived areas of the country, but this is not due to an 
absence of economic activity in the borough (which boasts 
a surfeit of highly paid jobs due to the presence of Canary 
Wharf). Rather, factors such as a lack of skills, social capital 
and networks lead to the inhabitants being unable to access 
opportunities that are there. The result is a clearly bifurcated 
local labour market.
Furthermore, the IMD does not avoid the ‘cost of living’ 
issues identified above. In the English IMD, the overall rank 
of an area is extremely highly correlated with its rank on the 
income portion (Ministry of Housing Communities & Local 
Government, 2015). In fact, a correlation coefficient of 0.95 
means that we can almost perfectly predict an area’s relative 
overall deprivation from its deprivation on an income score. 
The problem here is that the incomes in question are nominal – 
once again they fail to adjust for differences in prices across 
the country. Indeed, our evidence suggests that there is a strong 
rationale for adopting a more holistic view of regional dis-
parities, such as that proposed by Perrons and Dunford (2013) 
with the clear caveat that any part of the index that is based 
upon income should adjust for price differences across regions 
(and particularly in London).
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2.9 CONCLUSION
This chapter has shown that relative regional price levels have 
a considerable impact on regional incomes. This has important 
consequences given that local authorities with lower nominal 
per capita household disposable income tended to vote in favour 
of Brexit. The same pattern is visible for wages. It should also 
be absolutely critical in any future decision regarding funding 
flows, which is a theme we will return to in our policy chapter. 
This will certainly be true in a post-Brexit environment, but we 
argue that our evidence, combined with known flaws in the GVA 
per capita measure, should also cause the EU to fundamentally 
reassess its own structural fund and cohesion fund. The issues 
that exist in the UK are also visible across Europe, and many of 
the policy recommendations we make in Chapter 4 are likely to 
be applicable in a variety of European states. As such, although 
these recommendations are framed in terms of Brexit, they have 
a pan-European (and, indeed, international) dimension.
Our evidence suggests that present allocation mechanisms 
are poor. However, given the present state of the data it is 
not possible to reliably determine if such funds are making a 
difference at the macrolevel. In the British context, London’s 
GDHI per capita has risen from 22% above the UK average 
in 1997 to 40% above the UK average in 2016. Is this due 
to improved economic performance (and can the rest of the 
country learn from it?) or does it merely reflect a rise in aver-
age prices (especially housing)? These questions matter, and 
they matter more than ever in a post-Brexit context. Improv-
ing measurement to the point of being able to offer longer-
term solutions is a key area for future research and a major 
policy recommendation of this book.
Moreover, returning to the theme of Rodríguez-Pose 
(2018) and others (Goodwin & Heath, 2016; Kriesi & Pap-
pas, 2015): is the current wave of populism spanning the 
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globe, of which Brexit is just an example, a manifestation of 
regional policy gone wrong? Is the problem not so much one 
of individuals being ‘left behind’ but rather regions becoming 
‘places that don’t matter’ (Goodwin & Heath, 2016; Kriesi & 
Pappas, 2015)? Data on household incomes can only partially 
answer this question: incomes may be related to where indi-
viduals live, but they also fundamentally reflect the character-
istics of those who choose (or are compelled by either policy 
or a lack of wherewithal) to live there. The next chapter seeks 
to address this question more directly: how productive are 
different regions in the light of subnational price variations? 
The subsequent chapter then asks the crucial question: in light 
of both Brexit and this new evidence, what policy options can 




2. As is standard in such analysis (Deaton & Dupriez, 2013; Ley, 
2005; OECD, 2012), we used plutocratic rather than democratic 
weights here (see Fisher & Fisher, 2005, for a discussion of the 
value-judgements implicit in the choice of weights). The resultant 
price levels are thus well suited to deflating GDHI per capita. The 
trade-off is that the weights may not mirror the experience of a 
‘typical’ individual as they give more weight to those with higher 
expenditure (typically high-income individuals).
3. Obviously there are some stark differences – dividends can be 
altered or suspended at the directors’ discretion, whilst coupon 
payments are unchanging. Rent typically falls somewhere in-
between, with infrequent changes. The running yield on property is 
often higher than many other assets due to the costs and difficulties 
associated with purchase or sale of property as well as maintenance 
costs and the risk of non-occupancy, rent arrears, etc.
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4. Bilateral Laspeyres and Paasche indices are calculated for each 
region-pair (with the former being a weighted arithmetic mean and 
the latter a weighted harmonic mean), before computing a bilateral 
Fisher index (the geometric average of Laspeyres and Paasche 
indices) and using the modified Eurostat-OECD EKS procedure to 
obtain a series of transitive relative price levels.
5. This is admittedly a strong assumption, but is not unsupportable: 
local price variations mostly reflect differences in the quality of 
amenities. In contrast, price differences over larger areas mostly 
reflect differences in the cost of living. The litmus test is whether 
the labour market is largely self-contained: can one live in place 
A and work in place B? Groceries in town A may be more costly 
than in town B due to the fact that town A has a preponderance 
of Waitrose stores whilst town B is served by Lidl. As the two 
are proximate, those living in town A can shop at Lidl in town 
B (and vice versa). Although measured prices appear different, 
they are in fact identical. In contrast, a pint of (the same) beer is 
significantly more costly in London than in Yorkshire, even if the 
pub is otherwise identical due to differences in the cost of providing 
the service (staff costs, rents, etc.). It is not feasible to travel from 
London to Yorkshire simply to enjoy a cheaper pint! Measured 
price differences do indeed reflect real price differences in this case. 
The same logic applies for housing costs, etc.
39
3
THINKING OUTSIDE THE BOX 
(PART 2): REAL LABOUR  
PRODUCTIVITY
3.1 OVERVIEW
In this chapter, we consider the impact of regional price dif-
ferences on gross value added (GVA). We attempt to develop 
regional purchasing power parities (PPPs), focussing on the 
creation of both lower-bound and central estimates there-
of. We conclude that nominal figures understate the size of 
the real economy in northern regions and commensurately 
overestimate the size of the economy in London. This has 
important ramifications for regional policy, particularly in 
a post-Brexit environment. Moreover, similar patterns are 
likely to be visible across Europe, suggesting that future 
European Union (EU) policy will also want to take subna-
tional price-differences into account. There are strong policy 
implications from this chapter, which we explore in more 
depth in Chapter 4.
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•	 Introduction – This section outlines the importance 
and appropriate uses of GVA and briefly discusses the 
regionalisation process adopted by the Office for National 
Statistics (ONS).
•	 Price levels: As with other measures, GVA fails to 
adequately account for price differences across regions.
–   The theory of price-level comparisons: outlining the 
Eurostat-OECD methodology
–  From GVA to gross domestic product (GDP)…
—   A discussion of taxation and methods of apportionment
—   Setting upper and lower bounds…
–   Price comparisons in the household sector
—   Methods of apportioning household final 
consumption expenditure (HHFCE)
—   Calculating relative price levels (RRCPLs + rents – 
challenges re: national and domestic)
–   Price comparisons in the Government sector
—   Apportionment (easier?)
—   Calculating relative price levels (straightforward 
outside London but depends on London weighting 
and importance of wages)
–   Price comparisons for investment
—   Gross capital formation (GCC) and Gross fixed 
capital formation (GFCF): assume prices are 
constant for all industries except construction
—   Apportionment = data on construction AND 
remainder can use one of several methods (ONS 
data or DIY by industry?)
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–   How to treat non-profit institutions serving households 
(NPISH)?
–   Net exports
•	 Technical Issues: Two further technical issues remain to 
be discussed – Financial intermediation services indirectly 
measured (FISIM) and imputed rents
–   FISIM – In Appendix 3, we outline why the size of 
the financial services sector is overstated and how this 
affects regional GVA
–   Imputed rents – Here we reprise the discussion of 
the previous chapter regarding the regionalisation of 
imputed rents and their implications for regional GVA
•	 Putting it all together: Establishing credible upper and 
lower bounds for price levels and GDP.
•	 Showing the impact on productivity.
•	 Conclusion: Time to reassess regional success?
3.2 INTRODUCTION
GVA can be thought of as a ‘pure’ measure of economic output1 
and is also sometimes referred to as GDP at basic prices. Like 
GDP, it is a measure of the value added within an economy. 
However, whereas GDP measures value added at market prices 
(i.e. the price paid by the end user), GVA measures value added 
at the prices received by the producer. The difference between 
the two is therefore equal to the value of taxes less subsidies on 
goods. In the UK, the majority of this is accounted for by value-
added tax (VAT) with a lesser portion being accounted for by 
various duties (predominantly on fuel, alcohol and tobacco).
The importance of GVA should thus be clear. On an offi-
cial level, GVA per capita is used to determine eligibility for 
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EU structural funding. The UK Government’s Industrial 
Strategy Green Paper uses regional GVA per capita to illus-
trate the need for an industrial strategy with a spatial dimen-
sion (Department for Business Energy & Industrial Strategy, 
2017). By the time of the publication of the White Paper, 
the UK Government was discussing regional differences in 
labour productivity directly – GVA per hour worked (HM 
Government, 2017).
More broadly, GVA is used as a key performance indicator 
for many Local Enterprise Partnerships and is being used as 
one of several internal targets by some combined authorities 
(see e.g. WMCA, 2016). Similarly, in the academic literature, 
GVA growth disparities and differences in labour productiv-
ity (GVA per hour) are widely used (and conceptually correct) 
both as justifications and objects of research in their own 
right. Indeed, within the economic profession, productivity 
is widely regarded as the key determinant of long-run living 
standards (Krugman, 1997).
Why does this matter beyond academic debate? Simply 
put, policy is made on the basis of these figures. As already 
discussed, they matter for funding allocations (particularly at 
an EU level) but they also influence policy in other subtle but 
important ways. If London’s price-adjusted productivity is 
lower than official figures suggest then it becomes extremely 
difficult to justify the comparatively high levels of spending 
on transport and education that the capital enjoys. Our cal-
culations suggest that such monies might give a better ‘bang 
for buck’ (at least in productivity terms) if invested in the 
‘Brexit heartlands’ of the Midlands and North of England – a 
theme we investigate in greater detail in Chapter 4. Figs. 5–7 
also add nuance to the argument that the vote for Brexit was 
driven by relative prosperity, as can be seen in the results of 
the previous chapters. Here, we consider the most appropri-
ate and feasible strategies for deflating regional GDP.
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GDP can be calculated in three different ways, namely on 
the basis of income, output and expenditure. Whilst in theory 
all three should be equal, it is clearly impossible to measure 
every single aspect of the economy with perfect accuracy. As 
a result, the ONS uses a ‘balancing’ framework in which all 
three are constrained to be equal. This process takes the most 
robust elements of each of the three in order to ascertain the 
most accurate figures possible. At the time of writing, the bal-
ancing process typically takes place two years in arrears.
Prior to this, the ONS uses information from each approach 
as it becomes available (one of the reasons why GDP figures 
are typically revised). Naturally, less information is available 
on a regional level. Accurately apportioning taxation to UK 
regions is extremely challenging. We also lack information 
on intra-UK exports and imports (e.g. goods or services pro-
duced in the North West but sold in the South East and vice 
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What are available, however, are figures that exclude taxes 
and subsidies, that is, GVA. As can be surmised, GVA can be cal-
culated either on the basis of the income method or on the basis 
of measured output (at basic prices). The Regional Accounts 
team use a ‘top down’ methodology to apportion GVA to each 
region (West et al., 2016). This is done for both the income 
and output methods and takes place by component, industry 
and region (West et al., 2016). In essence, the national totals 
are ‘regionalised’ using appropriate ‘regional indicators’ (West 
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et al., 2016). These include a variety of measures, although the 
majority of indicators come from direct surveys of businesses 
(particularly the Annual Business Survey, the Business Register 
and Employment Survey and the Annual Survey of Hours and 
Earnings). The results then undergo a complex balancing pro-
cedure in order to ensure the resulting figures are as accurate 
and robust as possible (West et al., 2016).
3.3 PRICE LEVELS
The ONS therefore produce the best possible measure of 
nominal GVA given the constraints they face (both in terms 
of resources and due to the need to satisfy international and 
European standards). For many purposes, nominal GVA is 
indeed the appropriate measurement to use. Nevertheless, 
when assessing relative regional economic success, or relative 
productivity levels, it is real GVA (deflated by an appropriate 
PPP) that is needed. Crucially, whilst the ONS now produce 
estimates of real (as opposed to nominal) GVA growth over 
time, these are based on national deflators at an industry level 
rather than regional ones.
The upshot of this is that, given that industry inflation lev-
els don’t vary dramatically by region2 the real GVA estimates 
produced by the ONS are likely to be a robust way of compar-
ing a given region’s economic performance over time. Unfor-
tunately, they are not suitable for comparing the level of GVA 
across a set of regions at a given point. Given the absence of 
true regional industry-level price levels, it appears that cal-
culating regional productivity adjusted for regional price dif-
ferences is impossible. We argue that this is not the case. On 
the contrary, given appropriate assumptions, it is possible to 
develop a credible estimate of the lower bound for the impact 
of price differences on relative regional productivity levels.
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One of the key empirical contributions of this book is to 
do precisely that. We then suggest a further set of assumptions 
to derive a preferred estimate of real regional productivity. It 
should be stressed at this point that these estimates should be 
seen as the beginning of a broader discussion of the issue rath-
er than the final word. Further debate over the precise magni-
tude of the effect identified is to be welcomed and encouraged 
and future methodological innovations will hopefully enable 
researchers to capture it more fully. Nevertheless, our esti-
mates undoubtedly represent a dramatic adjustment relative 
to the status quo, which does not adjust for prices at all.
As mentioned above, given the absence of regional price 
levels by industry it is not possible to calculate real GVA 
directly. What can be done, however, is to use a variety of data 
sources to calculate estimates of PPPs for regional GDP. This is 
the approach used to compare real GDP across countries and 
has proved a rich source of information for macroeconomists 
concerned with differences across countries and over time. In 
this chapter, we build on the approach adopted by Eurostat 
and the OECD, although due to differences in the data that 
are available our results are not precisely comparable to theirs.
On a cross-country basis, these effects are highly signifi-
cant (even for countries that share a common currency). As an 
example, in pure Euro terms, France’s GDP per capita is a full 
38% higher than Spain’s. In PPP terms, however, the gap falls 
to below 14%. In other words, most of the nominal disparity 
between French and Spanish GDP is purely due to price dif-
ferences in the two countries. Since, for most purposes,3 when 
comparing areas we are interested in the amount produced 
rather than its price – it is the PPP-adjusted figures that should 
be of interest to us.
As outlined in the previous chapter, we adopt the Eurostat-
OECD Èltetö-Köves-Szulc (EKS) method to calculate PPPs 
for each Government Office Region. In order to do so, we 
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need regional GDPs calculated on the basis of the expenditure 
method. Two theoretical approaches suggest themselves: the 
first is to estimate a complete set of regional supply and use 
tables building on the work done by Thissen, Lankhuizen, 
Los, Oort, and Diodato (2017). Such an approach would ena-
ble us to estimate regional trade directly and thus calculate 
estimates of regional net exports.
Accurate calculation of regional imports and exports is 
one of the most challenging elements of any such analysis. 
Traditional methods based upon location quotients have 
tended to underestimate regional imports (Flegg & Tohmo, 
2013). Cross-hauling is a further issue in the production of 
regional supply and use tables, although modern approaches 
seek to deal with this. Traditional methods have relied upon 
data on transport flows, particularly of heavy goods vehicles, 
to add data to location quotient-based estimates.4
Service ‘exports’ from one region to another present a 
particular challenge as very often no physical trace is left. If 
a company (or individual) based in the North East uses an 
accountancy firm based in the North West then no obvious 
trace is left of the transaction, although for our purposes it 
should be classed as an export from the North West to the 
North East. Transactions within companies or involving 
individuals visiting different reasons for leisure purposes are 
likewise almost impossible to accurately map and might be 
thought of as an extension to the cross-hauling problem.
Given that only a small subset of the total data available 
is of interest to us, an alternative route is available. Namely, 
following a similar top-down process to that adopted by 
the ONS, we can regionalise various elements of regional 
GDP via the expenditure method. This presents its own dif-
ficulties, but if all components (including GDP itself) can be 




Regionalisation of each component of GDP(E) is done on a 
nominal basis and then deflated using the relative price level. 
In the following subsections we deal with regionalisation of 
each element in turn, before examining measures of relative 
price levels in each sector.
3.4.1 From GVA to GDP…
Given that GDP = GVA + taxes less subsidies on products 
and we know regional GVA in nominal terms, the challenge 
is to apportion taxes less subsidies on products. Nationally, 
GVA accounts for over 89% of total GDP (ONS, 2017h). Of 
the remainder, almost two-thirds are accounted for by VAT 
and the remainder are accounted for by other taxes less sub-
sidies (predominantly duties on fuel, alcohol, tobacco etc., 
ONS, 2017h) No (UK) VAT or duty is applicable to prod-
ucts and services extra-regio (taxes on production, which are 
applicable to the continental shelf, are already included in 
GVA at basic prices), rendering GDP for this region strictly 
equal to its GVA. In any event, its total contribution (primar-
ily offshore oil and gas) is modest.
For the other (onshore) UK regions, two options stand 
out. The first is simply to assume that VAT and duties are 
proportional to GVA (excluding extra-regio). This is super-
ficially attractive – it makes intuitive sense to ascribe a VAT 
proportionally to the regions where value is added. It also 
has the advantage of matching the approach used by Euro-
stat (2018a). This approach forms a useful baseline and can 
be thought of as an extreme against which to compare other 
estimates. Indeed, we use this approach in our ‘absolute lower 
bound’ estimates for this very reason.
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The second approach is somewhat more involved but 
ascribes to the principles on which VAT (and duties) are actual-
ly levied – namely at the point of consumption. In other words, 
this conceptual approach treats regions in the same fashion as 
countries for GDP purposed. On a European level, if a French 
company exports goods to Germany, the VAT is paid to the 
German government (by German consumers) and not France 
(and is thus part of German GDP rather than French GDP).5 
The same is not true for most services (broadcasting, telecoms 
and electronic services levy VAT at the point of consumption), 
where VAT is levied at the point of sale rather than at the point 
of consumption.
Of course, for most services, the place of sale is the place of 
consumption. Where things become complex is in the treat-
ment of non-residents. Although cross-region commuters 
are unlikely to purchase a great number of VAT-able items 
(most supermarket sales of food and those of takeaways 
served cold are zero-rated), many tourists will. This is true 
of both domestic and international tourists. Given London’s 
attraction as a national and international tourist destination, 
any estimates based upon the consumption of residents will 
probably underestimate the amount of VAT that should be 
ascribed to the region. In practice, all activities likely to be 
affected by this (namely transport, accommodation and food, 
and arts and recreation) account for less than 10% of the UK 
economy meaning that any distortion from the ‘London tour-
ist effect’ is likely to be very small indeed.
Ultimately, therefore, we would argue that the most appro-
priate procedure to apportion VAT to the regions is to use the 
VAT proportions calculated by the ONS in their experimen-
tal statistics on country and regional public finances (ONS, 
2017c). A similar procedure can be used to apportion other 
taxes less subsidies on products, generating an estimate of 
regional GDP. Ultimately, the overall proportions accounted 
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for by different regions change little: whether one uses the 
Eurostat apportionment procedure or our alternative will 
therefore make little difference to estimates of regional prices. 
The impact on measured (nominal) productivity is some-
what greater, with relative productivity increasing by 2.1% in 
Wales and falling by 2.6% in London. The remaining regions 
in Great Britain fall between these two extremes. These results 
(i.e. both those based on assuming regional GDP is exactly 
proportional to GVA and our preferred procedure) effectively 
bound nominal regional GDP from above and below.
3.4.2 The Household Sector
HHFCE represents direct spending by households as consum-
ers and is by far the largest component of total GDP in the 
UK. Spending relates to that amount spent by residents (irre-
spective of the region in which it is spent). Given that GDP is a 
domestic concept, this at first seems paradoxical (as residency 
fundamentally relates to the national concept – or in our case 
the regional one). The answer lies in imports and exports: 
spending by tourists from region A in region B is counted as 
part of region A’s HHFCE. The same amount is then subtract-
ed from region A’s GDP in the form of an import. Meanwhile, 
it does not count as part of region B’s HHFCE but is rather 
an export from region B to region A. The net result is that 
the tourist spending is counted as adding to region B’s GDP 
but not region A’s. As can be imagined, regions which are net 
recipients of domestic tourists and commuters should enjoy 
a boost in exports relative to those who are net suppliers of 
tourists and commuters.
There are several ways of apportioning nominal consumer 
expenditure. The first is by population – simply assuming that 
the average person in each region spends the same amount. 
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This will systematically understate (nominal) consumption in 
areas where (nominal) income is higher. In other words, it 
will understate consumption in London and the South East 
and overstate consumption in the North. The other extreme is 
simply to assume that HHFCE is proportional to GVA. This 
will, naturally, overstate consumption in regions that see an 
inflow of commuters and that have higher nominal incomes 
as evidence suggests that saving is greater amongst higher-
income individuals (Larrimore, Dodini, & Thomas, 2016).
A preferable approach to both of these is to apportion nom-
inal spending by the nominal incomes of those actually resi-
dent in an area. In practice, this means apportioning spending 
on the basis of the ONS’ estimates of nominal regional gross 
disposable household income (GDHI). This should be close 
to total consumption spending. Given the evidence of the 
previous chapter that real household incomes per capita are 
somewhat higher in London and the South East, one would 
expect individuals in these regions to save a larger proportion 
of their total incomes (Huggett & Ventura, 2000), suggesting 
that this will overestimate consumption in these regions.
Indeed, the fact that what limited data we have suggests that 
wealth in London and the South East is significantly higher than 
elsewhere in the country adds credence to this. Nevertheless, it is 
likely that the divergence in wealth across the UK is being driv-
en by both differences in initial capital endowments (wealthy 
individuals are concentrated near London), high growth rates in 
asset values and the fact that real estate values in London and 
the South East have risen more rapidly than elsewhere. In any 
event, as price levels are based on consumption (a flow) rather 
than wealth (a stock), the ultimate effect of wealth divergences 
on the proportion of income consumed is unlikely to be large 
meaning that the net impact should be close to zero.
An alternative is to use the ONS’ estimates of the propor-
tion of VAT attributable to regions (ONS, 2017c).6 This uses 
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data from the living costs and food (LCF) survey. Since VAT 
and consumption should be broadly proportionate to one 
another, this is likely to be an effective estimate of regional 
HHFCE. A particular weakness of this approach is the fact 
that VAT is not charged on rents (including imputed rents), 
suggesting that it is underestimating nominal consumption in 
regions where rents are more costly. Once again, this is likely 
to underestimate the proportion of total expenditure in Lon-
don and the South East. It is reassuring that both the GDHI 
and VAT approaches give extremely similar figures for the 
proportion of HHFCE accounted for by each region.
As a result, we feel confident in asserting that the ONS’ 
VAT estimates are excellent candidates for calculating a lower 
bound for the proportion of total HHFCE in London and the 
South East (and a commensurate upper bound in the North). 
The ONS estimates of the proportion of VAT attributable to 
regions exhibit some year to year variability, and for Scot-
land using GDHI as the basis of apportionment appears to 
match official figures better (Scottish Government, 2018). As 
a result, we use the GDHI figures for our central estimates.
Indeed, the final results are relatively insensitive to the 
method used to apportion HHFCE with the difference 
between the VAT-based lower bound and the GVA-based 
upper bound amounting to less than a one percentage point 
difference in the PPP for any region (the extremes being 
London, whose PPP increases by 0.8% and the South West, 
whose PPP falls by 0.5%). As a result, we are confident in the 
robustness of our approach and results.
3.4.3 Non-profi t Inst i tut ions Serving Households
These comprise non-profit institutions that are not mainly 
financed and controlled by government. They provide goods 
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and services to households at prices that are not economi-
cally significant (or free). Examples include religious societies, 
clubs (including sports clubs), trade unions, political parties 
or organisations, etc. Charities tend to belong in this sector. 
Regionalising the spending of NPISH is extremely challeng-
ing. Given the absence of better data, we regionalise the nomi-
nal spending of NPISH by population, sourced from the ONS’ 
official population statistics (ONS, 2018a). Given the small 
size of the sector and the fact that in our present estimates we 
assume zero cost differences across regions in the sector, this 
is an acceptable compromise. The NPISH sector is an area 
where future research may seek to refine these estimates.
3.4.4 Gross Capital Consumption
Gross capital consumption is primarily comprised GFCF 
(97%), plus changes in inventories and acquisitions less dis-
posals. Given the minimal importance of the latter, we focus 
on GFCF and assume that changes in inventories plus acqui-
sitions less disposals are proportional to GFCF. This is con-
sists of transport equipment, other machinery and equipment 
(including information technology (IT) equipment), intellec-
tual property, dwellings and other buildings.
The ONS provide regional estimates of GFCF to Eurostat, 
although the ONS has serious concerns about the quality 
of data (ONS, 2017i). It is noteworthy that, for Scotland at 
least, these estimates differ substantially from those used in 
the Scottish National Accounts (Scottish Government, 2018). 
Nevertheless, they remain the best estimates that we have 
available at present.
Of total UK GFCF, some £72,945m was on dwellings. 
Since total UK GFCF in the real estate sector was £91,536m, 
it’s clear that dwellings represent some 79.7% of total real 
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estate investment. In the absence of any indication to the con-
trary, we assume that this proportion is the same for each 
region. Transfer costs (which represent the bulk of the rest 
of real estate GFCF) and investment in equipment are likely 
to be proportional to spending on dwellings so this seems an 
eminently reasonable assumption to make.7
For all other industries, we use data from the supply and 
use tables (ONS, 2017e) to ascertain on a national level what 
proportion of GFCF was spent on inputs from the construc-
tion industry. This varies from 4% in the professional services 
and support industries to some 52% in ‘other services’ (which 
includes creative arts, libraries and museums, sports organisa-
tions, etc.). Once again, in the absence of any further informa-
tion we assume that these proportions are equal in every region.
Doing so we can divide capital expenditure into two parts 
for each region: the first being one in which prices vary (name-
ly dwellings plus that proportion of GFCF spent on construc-
tion by industries other than real estate). The second part of 
capital expenditure is one for which prices do not vary. The 
relative weights for each region will differ due to differences 
in the industrial composition of regional GFCF. As a result, 
these weights can be used as an input into the EKS method.
3.4.5 Government Expenditure
Government expenditure is regionalised by using figures 
from the Country and Regional Public Sector Finances 
(ONS, 2017c). This estimates UK government expenditure 
by sector for each country and region for the 2016/17 tax 
year (which is closest to the 2016 calendar year). As we are 
solely interested in government final expenditure, we exclude 
those categories of expenditure that pertain to transfers or 
intermediate consumption.
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Doing so yields estimates for the entire UK that are 
extremely close to the ONS Blue Book estimate of government 
spending (ONS, 2017h). Similarly our estimates for Scotland 
are extremely close to the official figures given by the Scottish 
Government (2018), which gives a degree of confidence in the 
robustness of our estimates. At present, we lack comprehen-
sive data on relative regional prices in the government sector 
and so there are no benefits to regionalising components of 
government spending at present. In future, the same source 
data are likely to prove useful in seeking to regionalise the 
various components of government spending.
3.4.6 Appor tioning Regional GDP
The table overleaf presents the results of this apportionment. To 
reiterate:
= + −GDP GVA Taxes on production Subsidies of production
To recap, GVA is regionalised using the Regional Accounts 
data, whilst VAT (which comprises the bulk of relevant taxes) 
is apportioned from ONS estimates of regional VAT pay-
ments (ONS, 2017c) and the remainder from estimates of 
other taxes and subsidies on production (ONS, 2017c)
HHFCE can be apportioned from either nominal GDHI 
data (ONS, 2018f) or the aforementioned VAT statistics. In 
either case the results are similar, but we prefer the former due 
to the greater stability of estimates over time. Output of the 
non-profit sector is regionalised using an estimate of popula-
tion (ONS, 2018a), although this sector is small.
Gross capital consumption is regionalised using data from 
Eurostat (2018b) on regional gross fixed capital formation 
(which forms around 97% of total gross capital consump-
tion), whilst government expenditure is regionalised using 
data from the Country and Regional Analysis (HM Treas-




















































































































































































































































































































56 Regional Success After Brexit
left over after completing this process. Table 2 shows what 
proportion of each region’s nominal GDP is accounted for by 
each sector. These weights are important inputs into the EKS 
process used to estimate real regional GDP later.
3.5 REGIONAL PRICES
3.5.1 The Household Sector
This is both the most important and the easiest sector to 
derive prices for. We first note that, unlike for household 
incomes, GDP is calculated on a ‘domestic’ basis. In the 
absence of information on exactly how much is spent by con-
sumers in each region, we use the data from the LCF survey 
to ascertain the proportion of total spending accounted for by 
each category. We adopt the same procedure as the previous 
chapter and utilise the same data sources. Indeed, the ONS 
RRCPLs are, if anything, more suited to this use (with the 
same methods and sources as we have). We then calculate the 
proportion of total spending accounted for by housing in the 
same manner as the previous chapter.
Housing costs can be derived in one of three ways. Firstly, 
the costs of social housing are estimated directly from the 
Family Resources Survey (FRS). This is true across approach-
es. Private sector and imputed rents then both use the figures 
given in the FRS covering the 2016/17 financial year, which 
aligns most closely to the 2016 calendar year. These are the 
most conservative estimates of rental cost differences, show-
ing that rents in London are 111% higher than those in the 
North East of England.
There are good reasons to consider this a highly con-
servative estimate of London rents. Firstly, due to its com-
paratively small sample size, the figures for the FRS tend to 
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fluctuate quite significantly year-by-year. In the previous year, 
for example, renting in London appeared 140% more costly 
than in the North East. Indeed, the FRS data imply that rents 
in London fell by almost 7% between 2015 and 2016, contra-
dicting evidence from the ONS’ own Index of Private Hous-
ing Rental Prices (ONS, 2018c). In addition, the FRS data 
apply to median rents, whereas for the purposes of deflating 
GVA, mean rents are the more relevant measure.
The other potential option is to directly use GVA itself. 
This contains an implicit deflator because rental income 
(including imputed rent) is estimated for the real estate sector 
for each region as a component of regional GVA. Specifically, 
a component of GVA is the ‘rental income of households and 
NPISH’, which includes imputed rents. As is pointed out in 
the GVA methodology guides, these are regionalised
using estimates of median property prices 
by region from ONS and the devolved 
administrations, these are multiplied by regional 
dwelling stock obtained from DCLG, the Welsh 
Government, the Scottish Government and the 
Department of Finance and Personnel Northern 
Ireland. (West et al., 2016, p. 15)
Since the figures for regional dwelling stock are readily avail-
able from the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local 
Government (formerly the Department for Communities and 
Local Government – DCLG), it is straightforward to derive 
implicit estimates of relative regional rents from the Regional 
Accounts. These show a rather wider spread of regional rents 
than the FRS survey (with implicit rents in London being 
around 3.4 times those in the North East). Interestingly, this is 
a broadly similar order of magnitude to figures from the Valu-
ation Office Agency (2018) on regional rents in England.
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3.5.2 NPISH
In the absence of further information, we assume that there 
are zero price regional price differences for NPISH. The 
NPISH sector comprises around 3% of GDP and principally 
contains institutions of higher and further education (univer-
sities and colleges), charities, trade unions, religious organisa-
tions and political parties. Given that these organisations do 
not charge market prices for their services, their output has 
traditionally been valued at cost (ONS, 2014), although the 
ONS is currently reassessing the classification of universities 
as a result of changes to the tuition fee regime (ONS, 2018b).
It is likely that costs in London and the South East are at 
least as high as elsewhere since wages and salaries are higher 
in London and the South East than elsewhere (ONS, 2017b) 
and there is some evidence that commercial rents may also be 
higher in these regions (Colliers International, 2017). As such, 
we can be confident that our assumption of zero regional 
price differences for the NPISH sector is conservative.
3.5.3 Gross Capital Consumption
We assume that there are no regional price differences for 
GFCF comprised transport equipment, other machinery and 
equipment (including IT equipment) and intellectual prop-
erty. The law-of-one-price can be expected to apply to these, 
which collectively comprise around 44.1% of GFCF for the 
UK as a whole. A further 5.2% of national GFCF consists 
of ‘costs of transferring ownership on non-produced assets’ 
(overwhelmingly buildings), which again are unlikely to vary 
much by region. The remainder of GFCF represents buildings.
The data we have indicate that the costs of construction are 
typically higher in London and the South East than elsewhere 
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in the country (Building Cost Information Service (BCIS), 
2015). Specifically, we take the figures of the BCIS for 2015 
(BCIS, 2015) as estimates of the relative cost of fixed capital in 
the form of buildings (whether residential or otherwise), with 
the exception of Northern Ireland where an unusually small 
sample size leads to estimates that are implausibly low (around 
half of the UK average). Estimates of relative construction 
costs range from 91% of the UK average in the North West 
to 112% of the UK average in London. Given known data on 
salaries (ONS, 2017b), these estimates are plausible and are 
the best data we have available to us at the present time.
We use the EKS procedure as outlined above using the 
weights derived in the previous section together with the BCIS 
cost data for construction. As can be seen, costs vary relatively 
little across regions (partly by design). Nevertheless, there is 
a trend for higher prices in the South and East of the country 
(particularly in London and the South East). More puzzling 
are the above average prices of construction reported in the 
North East and East Midlands. It is unclear what might be 
driving this – it is entirely possible that measurement error in 
the source dataset is to blame, particularly as they are not offi-
cial statistics. Nevertheless, the figures suggesting that invest-
ment is on average around 10% cheaper in Wales, Yorkshire 
or the West Midlands relative to the capital and surrounding 
areas is certainly plausible. This is one area that future work 
on regional prices may want to concentrate on, although the 
ultimate impact is likely to be modest (at least in the UK where 
gross capital consumption accounts for under 20% of GDP).
3.5.4 Government Expenditure
Although major strides have been made to evaluate the out-
put of government, this remains challenging (Pont, 2008). 
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In any event, national data are regionalised by the ONS using 
input costs – predominantly wages (West et al., 2016), sug-
gesting that the appropriate measure of relative regional 
prices would be relative input costs. Outside of London, 
most public sector salaries are set on a national salary scale. 
Indeed, there are few data on relative prices in the govern-
ment sector. Nevertheless, there exists a patchwork of rather 
partial information on prices of certain elements of government 
expenditure.
In particular, large parts of the public sector have negoti-
ated a ‘London weighting’, whereby employees are paid more 
if they are located in the capital. This applies to staff in the 
NHS and education (Unison, 2017). Similarly, the Annual 
Survey of Hours and Earnings (ONS, 2017b) suggests that 
public sector employees in London earn some 30–40% more 
than their counterparts elsewhere in the country. It is difficult 
to assess the extent to which this is due to the London weight-
ing rather than the fact that higher managerial functions are 
more prevalent in London than elsewhere (particularly in the 
civil service).
Equally, salaries in those parts of the economy that are domi-
nated by public sector employees (notably health and education) 
Fig. 5. Relative Costs of Gross Fixed Capital Formation.
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are around 20–30% higher in London than elsewhere in the 
country (ONS, 2017b). Outside of London, salaries for equiva-
lent jobs are largely equal across the country (with a handful of 
minor exceptions in the East and South East in places that make 
up the so-called ‘fringe’ of Greater London).
Given these very limited data, the best course of action 
open to us is to assess how robust our results are to a variety 
of different assumptions about the cost of providing govern-
ment services. In particular, in our central scenario we assume 
that costs are identical across the country. For all regions apart 
from London this is a sensible assumption. Given the pre-
ponderance of ‘current expenditure’ in government spending 
(ONS, 2018d) and the fact that most public sector salaries are 
subject to a national pay scale, this is logical.
Table 3. Median Full-time Salaries (£) by Sector in 2016.





Education Health  
Care
North East 27,341 27,140 28,389 27,126
North West 29,326 30,554 28,810 26,824
Yorkshire and 
Humberside
27,878 29,888 28,061 26,791
East Midlands 28,011 27,962 28,775 27,028
West Midlands 28,462 32,124 27,409 26,336
East of England 30,748 31,781 30,778 27,972
London 36,632 37,630 35,000 34,334
South East 29,896 31,020 30,824 28,177
South West 29,588 30,044 29,591 26,911
Wales 28,490 29,923 27,664 28,180
Scotland 30,886 31,062 30,992 30,372
UK 30,540 31,914 30,347 28,408
Source: Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ONS, 2017b).
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The presence of the London weighting effectively guaran-
tees that assuming equal costs will underestimate price levels 
in London. Median full-time public sector salaries in the UK 
are around £30,500, whilst those in London are £37,500 
giving a difference of around 20%. London weightings dif-
fer substantially across the public sector – the NHS pay a 
20% supplement for workers in Inner London, a 15% sup-
plement for workers in Outer London and a 5% supplement 
for workers in the ‘fringe’ (Unison, 2017). Each of these is 
also subject to minimum and maximum thresholds (Unison, 
2017) In contrast, Sixth Form Colleges typically pay a set 
£3,764 supplement (irrespective of salary or position) in 
Inner London and £2,508 in Outer London. Teachers have 
variable thresholds but these are typically more generous 
(e.g. £5,631–£8,579 in Inner London). For reference, Inner 
London was traditionally defined as being within four miles 
of Charing Cross (Unison, 2017).
According to the Regional Accounts, compensation of 
employees accounts for around 80% of total GVA in the three 
parts of the economy (education, health and public administra-
tion – the latter including fire services, policing, the courts and 
civil service functions) that are dominated by the public sec-
tor (ONS, 2017f). Moreover, apart from Northern Ireland, this 
varies little across regions (from 77% in the East of England 
to 81% in London). National Accounts data (ONS, 2017h) 
indicate that some 85.6% of total resources in the government 
sector are spent on wages and salaries or employers’ social con-
tributions (generally pensions and employer’s National Insur-
ance contributions). Since the latter are broadly proportional 
to wages (both are typically calculated as a percentage of gross 
pay) their costs are also proportionate to salaries.
As a result, we argue that a weight of 80% for wages and sal-
aries as a proportion of total government output is conservative. 
We can thus investigate the sensitivity of our results to different 
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plausible assumptions about relative prices in the government 
sector. Specifically, we consider the following scenarios:
•	 Constant prices across the UK (our most conservative 
scenario) in the sector.
•	 A constant £3,000 London weighting for all public sector 
employees (equivalent to an 8.8% increase in employee 
costs in London, or a 7% increase in costs overall).
•	 A 20% increase in public sector London salaries vis-à-vis 
the rest of the UK, equivalent to a 16% in overall public 
sector costs.
3.5.5 Net Expor ts
Net exports are the simplest sector to estimate relative pric-
es for. The OECD (2012) use exchange rates as proxies for 
the PPPs of exports and imports. Given that all regions use a 
common currency, the exchange rate in question is unity, that 
is, there are zero price differences across regions. Such a pro-
cedure is adopted in international price comparisons and is 
equally applicable here. In any case, it makes conceptual sense 
and is good economics – any price difference would imply that 
consumers and businesses were making systematic mistakes in 
how they source goods and services across regional boundaries.
3.6 REGIONAL PPPS: SOME INITIAL ESTIMATES
In this section, we combine our estimates for prices by expend-
iture sector with the weights derived previously in order to 
generate initial estimates of regional PPPs. This is important 
because it will enable us to assess the extent to which extant 
regional flows are justifiable on the basis of relative regional 
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productivity. We find that this is not the case and therefore 
there is strong evidence that funding flows should be redi-
rected towards ‘poorer’ regions in the Midlands and North 
of England. Potential policy choices are discussed further in 
Chapter 4. We also find that the Scottish economy is larger 
than hitherto believed.
Although these are imperfect, we present a spectrum of differ-
ent results and show that even the most conservative estimates 
significantly increase measured regional productivity in poorer 
parts of the UK. This is of particular importance when combined 
with the results of Chen et al. (2018): those regions of the UK 
which are most exposed to Brexit carry greater economic weight 
than hitherto believed. As such, any national policy vis-à-vis the 
UK’s future relationship with continental Europe should give 
greater weight to the economic performance of these regions 
than it does at present. Moreover, this has interesting ramifica-
tions for academic studies combining both regional and national 
estimates of the potential economic impact of Brexit. Here, we 
consider a variety of different PPPs, all of which alter the balance 
of relative economic size and productivity within the UK.
3.6.1 The Lower Bound
At this point we are in a position to derive a lower bound for 
the size of the PPP effect. In effect, we deliberately design results 
that are biased towards zero price differences across regions. To 
do so, we apportion HHFCE to regions using the VAT estimates 
of the ONS. Regional GDP is assumed to be proportional to 
regional GVA (excluding the continental shelf). We use the first 
set of regional domestic price levels (using the RRCPLs and FRS 
data with its narrower regional differences). All other compo-
nents of expenditure (Non-Profit Institutes Serving Households, 
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government expenditure, gross capital formation, net exports, 
etc.) are assumed to have zero price differences across regions.9
We are confident that this underestimates the true differ-
ence in relative prices. As noted in the previous section, all 
estimates of regional prices for gross capital formation and 
government consumption indicate that prices in the south of 
the UK are at least as high as those further North. As such, 
we can be confident that we are indeed establishing a lower 
bound for price differences across the UK. Using the same 
EKS procedure as previously (again following the OECD, 
2012) we aggregate these different levels of expenditure using 
the weights and price levels outlined here:
As can be seen, price levels (in PPP terms) do appear to 
systematically differ across the UK. Even our lower bound 
figures indicate that prices in London are at least 10% above 
the national average (with those in the South East around 
5% above the national average). Conversely, prices across 
the devolved administrations as well as the North and Mid-
lands, are below the national average. As such, whilst London 
remains (by far) the largest and most productive region in the 
UK, its dominance is significantly attenuated.
In fact, there is a further issue here. If we accept the FRS 
as our preferred measure of rents (and imputed rents) then 
Fig. 6. Estimated Absolute Lower Bound PPPs by Region.
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it should also be used to regionalise rents in the Regional 
Accounts. This has the effect of reducing (nominal) regional 
GVA in London by around 4% and increasing it in most other 
regions (the South West enjoys an uplift of some 3.2%). Ulti-
mately the combined effect of both changes is rather similar 
to simply using the deflator implied in the Regional Accounts 
estimates of imputed rents directly, as we do below.
3.6.2 More Realist ic Estimates
The most conservative of the four estimates below makes the 
same assumptions as our ‘lower bound’ – namely that the 
only prices that differ across regions are those of the house-
hold sector. All that is done differently is to use the measure 
of housing costs implied directly in the Regional Accounts’ 
estimates of GVA.
Our second estimate takes this and adds the price differences 
calculated above for gross capital consumption. All other sectors 
(government, NPISH, net exports, etc.) are assumed to have no 
price differences. The third estimate goes one step further and 
adds a wage premium of £3,000 for every public sector employ-
ee in London (as a proxy for the London weighting), which 
amounts to a 9.2% premium for the same work in the capital. 
The final estimate includes a public sector London wage premi-
um of 20% for the same work, that is, it assumes that 75% the 
entire London public sector pay premium in the Annual Survey 
of Hours and Earnings dataset (ONS, 2017b) is due to the Lon-
don weighting. This implies a public sector London weighting of 
just over £6,500, which is probably somewhat high.
As can be seen, the results are relatively impervious to a varie-
ty of different assumptions, largely reflecting the overwhelming 
importance of HHFCE in GDP, alongside the fact that most price 
variation occurs in consumer prices (particularly of housing). 
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Unsurprisingly, differences in price levels in the government 
sector only have a significant effect on the PPP of London and 
even then, a large London weighting of some £6,500 (or almost 
20% of salary) only has a 2.5% impact overall.
3.7 ESTIMATING REAL REGIONAL GDP  
AND PRODUCTIVITY
We are now able to estimate real regional GDP. Whilst a 
final, definitive assessment remains elusive, we can certainly 
derive a range within which nominal and real regional GDP 
lie. Moreover, we can show that the regional disparity in real 
Table 4. Estimated Regional PPPs.








North East 96.5 96.9 96.8 96.7




96.8 96.2 96.0 96.0
East  
Midlands
97.5 97.9 97.8 97.7
West  
Midlands
98.4 97.8 97.7 97.6
East 101.4 101.4 101.3 101.2
London 114.9 115.7 117.1 118.4
South East 106.2 107.2 107.1 107.0
South West 102.2 102.2 102.1 102.0
Wales 95.7 95.0 94.9 94.8
Scotland 98.6 98.7 98.6 98.5
Northern  
Ireland
94.8 94.8 94.7 94.6
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productivity (GDP per hour worked) is smaller than that of 
nominal productivity.
3.7.1 Model 1: An Absolute Minimum
Here we deliberately seek to underestimate the size of the 
effect to derive an ‘absolute lower bound’. We thus assume 
that GDP is directly proportional to GVA and measure hous-
ing costs using the FRS. We further assume that there are no 
price differences in any sector apart from the household one.10 
It should be noted that if we are to deflate housing costs using 
the FRS then this should also be the measure used to estimate 
regional rents. For our absolute minimum we do not do this 
and therefore it should be noted that this model deliberately 
underestimates the price differences across regions.
Simply deflating regional GDP without adjusting the 
imputed rents portion of GVA already leads to an increase 
of some 6% in GDP in Yorkshire and an 8% fall in London’s 
GDP. Indeed, even using this ‘absolute lower bound’ estimate 
significantly attenuates the productivity gap between NUTS1 
regions and sees Scotland overtake the South East as the sec-
ond most productive region in the UK.
3.7.2 Model 2: A Conservative Estimate
This model uses the same formulation as above with one key 
difference that should make it a more accurate measure of real 
regional productivity. In particular, we continue to assume that 
prices are uniform across all parts of the economy apart from the 
household sector. The critical change pertains to the treatment of 
housing costs. Instead of using survey data from the FRS, we use 
the deflator directly implied from the GVA data on rents.
We then compare this to an alternative estimate that involves 
reallocating rental income (including imputed rental income) to 
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UK regions using the FRS survey data (and data on total dwell-
ing stock) before deflating this by the ‘absolute lower bound’ 
measure of prices calculated above. If one is to use the ‘lower 
bound’ figures as a measure of prices then this is the conceptual-
ly correct thing to do. Interestingly, the impact of using the FRS-
based deflator combined with using the same source to allocate 
real estate rental income in GVA is almost identical to simply 
using the deflator implied by the regional GVA figures directly. 
As a result, we feel confident in using the latter for our estimates.
3.7.3 Models 3 and 4: Our Central Scenarios
In model 3, we use the ‘conservative’ model above but add 
price differences in the gross capital consumption and gov-
ernment sectors. The methodology is outlined in the previous 
sections, but fundamentally, the difference between this and 
the more conservative ‘model 2’ are extremely modest.
Our fourth and final model is somewhat more ambitious. 
Rather than simply assuming that regional GDP is propor-
tional to regional GVA, we attempt to apportion VAT and 
other taxes/subsidies on production to different regions. To 
do so, the ONS’ estimates of Country and Regional Pub-
lic Sector Finances were used (ONS, 2017c). These contain 
direct estimates of the VAT attributable to regions together 
with estimates of a number of other taxes (from which taxes 
on products can be isolated and summed). It should be noted 
that all of these data are experimental estimates.
3.8 CONCLUSION: TIME TO RE-EVALUATE REGIONAL 
SUCCESS?
As can be seen, the overall impact is to significantly attenuate 
estimates of productivity differences across the UK. Even the 
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‘absolute lower bound’ with its deliberate underestimate of 
price differences accounts for about half of the total impact. 
Using a more realistic conservative estimate accounts for a fur-
ther quarter of the total effect. As such, estimates of differences 
in the cost of government expenditure and gross capital con-
sumption largely amount to little more than tinkering around 
the edges. Attempting to apportion VAT and other taxes to 
regions takes a further bite out of London’s dominance (large-
ly because in the EU most VAT is assigned to the government 
of the place where consumption occurs rather than where pro-
duction occurs), although the absence of good data means that 
any realistic attempt to do so entails a degree of guesswork.
Several other factors stand out. London remains the 
most productive region in the UK by a significant margin. 











North East 5% 8% 8%




East Midlands 5% 7% 6%
West Midlands 3% 5% 5%
East 1% 2% 2%
London −8% −12% −11%
South East −2% −3% −3%
South West −1% 2% 1%
Wales 6% 9% 9%





The ranking of various regions also changes – Scotland 
overtakes the South East of England to become the second 
most productive region in the UK whilst Wales and North-
ern Ireland are within 2% of the South West in any sensi-
ble scenario. Indeed, even in our conservative scenario, the 
South East is just 5% more productive than the North West 
in real terms, as opposed to some 15% when measured in 
nominal terms.
This should cause us to fundamentally reassess our percep-
tions of regional economic differences in the UK. Rather than 
an unproductive North and a hyperproductive South, Lon-
don and Scotland stand out. Indeed, in contrast to traditional 
perceptions the UK appears to have a ‘hollow middle’ 
alongside Wales and Northern Ireland. These are all areas 
that have been hit particularly hard by de-industrialisation. 
Indeed, this further reinforces the work of Beatty and Fother-
gill (2017) suggesting that not only do areas that experienced 
large-scale job loss in the 1980s and 1990s still have higher 
rates of worklessness, but that they might also pay a price 
in terms of productivity. We would tentatively suggest that 
Fig. 7. Relative Regional Productivity in the UK.
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the strong performance of Scotland is possibly an indication 
that, done right, devolution can have a significant positive 
impact on productivity.
A considerable amount of space has been devoted to ques-
tions over the measurement of an issue that should prove 
important to all involved in regional policy post-Brexit. To 
reiterate the point made at the outset – we need price-adjust-
ed measures in order to better assess what regions need to do 
in order to respond to the Brexit vote.
The record of the ONS in producing high-quality statis-
tics is exemplary and in many areas they are world leading 
and their data underlies all of the estimates derived in this 
book. Unfortunately, nominal statistics on regional incomes 
and GVA, whilst very high quality and extremely useful for 
many tasks need to be complemented by real (price-adjusted) 
measures in order to assess regional success and failure.11
Now that we have considered two of the largest facets of 
regional economic performance, namely how much real dis-
posable income residents have and how productive its work-
force is (again in real rather than nominal terms), we are in 
a strong position to re-evaluate regional disparities. At this 
point, we are therefore able to consider the policy ramifica-
tions of our findings and what this means for regions in the 
light of Brexit. These crucial (and fascinating) issues are what 
the remainder of the book is devoted to.
NOTES
1. It is ‘gross’ in the sense of not making any allowance for 
depreciation.
2. The notable exception to this is the real estate industry (SIC2007 
code 68) where housing costs have increased more rapidly in some 
regions than others.
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3. There are notable and important exceptions to this rule. When 
calculating government debt (or the deficit) as a proportion of GDP, 
for example, it is nominal figures that are of interest.
4. Nevertheless, a great deal of interesting research has been done 
recently on input–output models, from global models (Steen-Olsen 
et al., 2016) to subnational analyses (Kim, Kratena, & Hewings, 
2015). The work of Los, Timmer, and de Vries (2016) is important 
in being able to use such tables to understand the value-added 
component of gross exports.
5. There are some interesting exceptions to this rule, particularly 
for businesses that sell only a small amount in the second country 
(below the VAT threshold, even if they are above the VAT threshold 
in terms of the goods they sell in their own country). In addition, 
selling to businesses in a second EU country that do not possess 
a valid VAT number typically involves levying VAT at the rate 
applicable in one’s home country. The interested reader is referred 
to Your Europe (2018) for further details.
6. There is no evidence that individuals in and around London 
are running down their stock of wealth more rapidly than those 
elsewhere to finance a more lavish lifestyle.
7. It is possible that transfer and equipment costs are broadly 
constant on a per-dwelling basis rather than a total expenditure 
basis but this is likely to have almost zero impact on our final 
estimates in practice.
8. It should be noted that these proportions are heavily affected 
by the very same factors that make GVA per capita a problematic 
measure. They are thus heavily distorted by tourism (including 
domestic tourism) and commuting. Any money spent by commuters 
in their place of work counts as an ‘export’ from their work 
region and an ‘import’ to their home region. The result is that, for 
example, any tube fares purchased by a commuter from Watford 
count as an export from London to the East of England as would 
any meals, coffee, etc., purchased in their workplace. Pensioners 
have a similarly distorting effect: a region full of retirees will 
produce very little measured economic output, but its consumption 
will be substantial. The inevitable result is that net exports will be 
negative. A progressive tax and benefits system that redistributes 
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from high income earners to those on lower incomes will have a 
similar effect.
9. A corollary of this assumption is that the apportionment of 
other expenditure components across regions is irrelevant. They all 
have the same relative price levels and can therefore be treated as a 
homogenous ‘lump’ (whether comprised government expenditure, 
investment, net exports, etc.).
10. In other words, we assume that there are no regional price 
differences in the not-for-profit sector or for government spending 
or investment (including building). This generates a deliberate 
underestimate of price differences, suitable for calculating a lower 
bound.
11. The absence of rigourous, timely and complete measures of 
regional prices (plus the absence of any measure of regional imports 
and exports or, alternatively, regional price levels by industry) that 
would meet their exceptionally high standards is one probable 
reason why the ONS does not produce the statistics that we have 
attempted to. Freed of the need to be 100% accurate and produce 
a single reference estimate, together with a little ingenuity, we have 
been able to posit a range of numbers within which we can be 





It is clear that these findings have major policy implications 
and work will need to be done to understand these further. This 
chapter is a first attempt to tease some of those fundamental 
policy points out and to steer the emergent debate. Brexit (at 
the time of writing) is an omnipresent issue in this context.1 We 
have argued that real (price-adjusted) figures, as calculated in 
the previous two chapters, are indispensable for policy makers 
who wish to address the regional divides so powerfully evident 
in the Brexit vote. Indeed, use of nominal figures can distort 
funding flows: London’s high transport spending (covered later 
in this chapter) might be understandable in light of its high 
nominal productivity. If, however, we adjust for price differenc-
es (as economic theory and international comparisons suggest 
we ought) then this disparity becomes much harder to justify.
As such, our results have significant implications for the 
geography of productivity and incomes and this will affect fund-
ing flows and other appropriate policies. Brexit presents some 
opportunities to adjust some of these but also major industrial 
challenges (Bailey & De Propris, 2017; Chen et al., 2018). 
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As such, we also discuss the ‘geography of discontent’ link-
ing regional economic development and the Brexit vote (Los, 
McCann, Springford, & Thissen, 2017). It is perhaps no 
accident that the NUTS1 regions that voted most heavily to 
leave the European Union (EU) are those where we find price-
adjusted productivity to be lowest. In order to do this, the 
chapter is structured as follows:
•	 Introduction and outline – This section introduces the 
reader to some of the major policy implications of our 
work, noting the existing policy environment.
•	 The current spending bias towards London and the South 
East – Here we examine the extent to which London and 
its environs dominate national infrastructure spending, 
noting that our figures imply that rebalancing towards the 
regions would benefit the UK as a whole.
•	 The Brexit overhang – This section explicitly examines 
the likely post-Brexit funding environment and considers 
what an optimal funding mechanism might look like.
•	 The case for ‘meaningful devolution’ – In this section, 
we examine the role of devolution in regional economic 
performance, making the case for greater devolution of 
powers.
•	 Moving beyond ‘people versus place’ – Here we outline 




We commenced this book by noting the nature of regional 
disparities and how they are conventionally treated by 
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government bodies. In so doing, we noted how gross value 
added (GVA)-based measures (particularly GVA per capita) 
were (and continue to be) key metrics by which such dis-
parities are calculated, and how the Government’s Industry 
Strategy Green Paper made reference to them. Our research 
findings have highlighted that measures traditionally used in 
the allocation of regional funding may distort funding flows.
Particularly egregious is the ongoing use of GVA per cap-
ita, despite the fact that the ONS (Dunnell, 2009) and Gri-
paios and Bishop (2006), amongst others, have demonstrated 
that it is not a measure of either regional productivity or 
regional wellbeing. In addition, commuting and demograph-
ics both grossly distort GVA per capita when measured on a 
subregional level: GVA per capita is higher in Islington (rep-
resented by the constituencies of Jeremy Corbyn and Emily 
Thornberry) than in Kensington and Chelsea.
By using a variety of official data, we constructed a series of 
different regional price indices suited to different purposes in 
order to show that some of the gaps between different parts of 
the UK are narrower than hitherto believed. However, this was 
not to suggest that regional disparities are trivial or non-existent. 
Indeed, we also found that whilst the relative positions of dif-
ferent regions changed dramatically, gaps in living standards 
remain substantial. We found that the poorest region is not in the 
North of England, rather it lies in the old industrial heartlands 
of the Midlands. In contrast, we found that Scotland overtook 
the South East of England in terms of productivity (and was only 
marginally behind in terms of incomes). This is extremely note-
worthy given the geography of the Brexit vote: Scotland voted 
heavily to remain whilst the West Midlands showed the highest 
leave vote in the country (closely followed by the East Midlands).
However, given the nature of the data that has been used in 
terms of assessing regional performance, it should not be sur-
prising that funding has – we would argue – disproportionately 
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favoured those areas seen to be successful by successive UK 
governments and policy makers. Indeed, this is particularly evi-
dent in transport funding, but also education. Simply put, quite 
striking is the difference in per capita funding between London 
and the rest of the UK − with only Scotland coming close. In 
this context, should it be any surprise that, with greater state 
investment in physical and human capital, London and Scot-
land perform better in terms of productivity? That both these 
‘regions’ have substantial devolved powers is also significant 
as a driving factor, with Scotland in particular having widely 
extant resourcing/ decision-making powers over public service 
and infrastructure provision (and a favourable funding settle-
ment via the Barnett formula). These are points we return to in 
subsequent sections of this chapter.
Table 6. Per Capita Funding (£) for Transport and Education, 
UK Government Office Region (GORs).
GOR Transport Education
North East 291 1,272
North West 370 1,276
Yorkshire and The 
Humber
335 1,280
East Midlands 220 1,244
West Midlands 314 1,286
East 333 1,266
London 944 1,605
South East 370 1,205
South West 305 1,190
Scotland 620 1,512
Wales 377 1,345
Northern Ireland 307 1,459
Source: HM Treasury (2018). See ‘Country and Regional Analysis 2017: 
A Tables’.
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In contrast, as seen from above, the East Midlands and 
West Midlands come out at − or near − the bottom in terms 
of these spending figures (having noted their relative income 
status above). It is perhaps no accident then that this ‘miss-
ing middle’ (Hearne, Forthcoming-a) of the UK voted most 
strongly for Brexit. In this context, it is of interest that the 
correlation between the regional Brexit vote (by GOR) is con-
siderably stronger using our purchasing power parity (PPP) 
adjusted productivity data than the nominal original. Appar-
ent here is that the Midlands has fared worst of all regions 
in the UK terms of foregone output over a long time period 
relative to the UK total (Hearne, Forthcoming-a).
In this final chapter, we hence wish to revisit the policy 
debate in light of our findings on the inadequacy of these 
measures and the implications for regional funding regimes 
in a post-Brexit environment. In the sections that follow, 
we examine why we think London in particular receives a 
disproportionate amount of public funding and the distor-
tionary effects that this has on economic performance and 
well-being in the rest of the UK. We focus on the highly 
illustrative examples of ‘The City’ and Westminster and the 
emblematic transport projects of the Heathrow Third Run-
way,2 Crossrail and HS2. In all of these cases, with London 
being the centre of both political and financial power in the 
UK, the underlying network of power relations between the 
UK Government and a handful of high-end businesses clus-
tered in the ‘Square Mile’ (financial services, legal services 
and management consultancies) have been key in sequester-
ing resources to these projects.
Having established the nature of London-centric approach-
es to public service and infrastructure spend in the UK, we then 
consider the threat that Brexit poses to the one genuine (albeit 
methodologically imperfect) means of redistributing wealth 
to poorer regions in the UK, European regional  development 
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funds, and the lack of any substance to replacement propos-
als for a ‘Shared Prosperity Fund’ after 2020 when the UK 
will (at the time of writing) have left the EU. We find that 
such conversations are still embryonic and raise concerns of 
actually being honoured, given the uncertain (but in all likeli-
hood negative) impact that Brexit will have on public finances 
(Dustmann & Frattini, 2014). Given this, the final section of 
the book discusses the implications for regional development, 
and what we argue is the need for greater devolution in the 
UK going forward.
4.3 THE CURRENT SPENDING BIAS TOWARDS 
LONDON AND THE SOUTH EAST
A particular theme that we have sought to ‘tease out’ in this 
work has been the overarching dominance of London and the 
South East in terms of prioritisation for ‘national infrastruc-
ture’ spending.3 In actuality, the area in question is even more 
precise in only constituting parts of London and the South 
East, that is, the financial services locales of inner London 
known as the ‘Square Mile’ or simply as ‘The City’, and cer-
tain corridors in the South East of England, notably Surrey 
and Brighton, Sevenoaks, Bishop’s Stortford/Saffron Walden 
and the Oxford–Cambridge nexus. In explaining this confla-
tion of the well-being of these areas with the ‘national inter-
est’ we have noted the concentration of political and financial 
power in these locales – a nexus of the political establishment, 
and associated firms in high-end legal and financial services. 
It is our contention that this concentration of sociopolitical 
power and attendant social capital networks has distorted 
funding priorities across the UK (and to the lasting detriment 
of most of the country). In the following section, we highlight 
some key examples of this.
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4.3.1. Heathrow’s Third Runway
In spite of the fact that London is served by some six inter-
national airports, which according to Transport for London 
handle more passengers than any other city region on the 
planet, the government has approved plans to build a third 
runway at Heathrow (BBC, 2018a). Although the estimated 
£14bn cost of Heathrow expansion (BBC, 2017b) would 
be met by its private sector owners, it has been alleged that 
more than £10bn of rail and road spending would ultimately 
need to be met by the public sector to support the expansion 
(Topham, 2018). In addition, the proposed runway plans may 
involve major works to reroute the M25 motorway (BBC, 
2018b). Given the complex corporate structure of Heathrow 
(Plimmer & Ford, 2018) and its highly leveraged balance 
sheet together with the possibility of substantial cost over-
runs (which are hardly uncommon for large infrastructure 
projects), it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the state 
bears a substantial amount of risk. In this regard, it enjoys an 
implicit subsidy not dissimilar to that of major banks (Noss 
& Sowerbutts, 2012). To reiterate, the results of our previous 
chapters suggest that it is difficult to justify such investments 
on the basis of London’s price-adjusted productivity.
4.3.2. HS2
High-Speed 2 (otherwise known as HS2) is a flagship project 
on behalf of the UK Government to link London to the West 
Midlands and the North of England (Manchester and Leeds) 
by a rapid mass-transit rail means of travel. The underpinning 
logic here is to significantly reduce travel times between key cit-
ies in the UK and improve connectivity to London (and osten-
sibly proximate European destinations via a link to Eurostar).
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However, there have been criticisms surrounding the over-
all connectivity of the earmarked route for HS2. Particularly 
problematic is that the route will not connect with key stations 
such as Birmingham New St or St Pancras (in this case neces-
sitating a walk between stations, from Euston, for interna-
tional travellers). In turn, the costs projected with the project 
have also seen significant inflation, with estimates suggesting 
an extra £43 billion needed beyond initial estimates (Ken-
tish, 2018), prompting calls from within the UK Parliament 
to review the scheme (Kentish, 2018). For Jenkins (2018), 
the costs associated with this project have been particularly 
egregious, with a quarter of the 1,346 staff employed being 
paid more than £100,000 p.a. and that ‘the company’s soaring 
consultancy bill also doubled last year to a staggering £600m, 
including £21m in one year on environment consultants’ (Jen-
kins, 2018). Such costs do indeed raise severe questions over 
the actual value for money associated with this project, and to 
invite critical review of the justifications used to push the pro-
ject forward in the first place. Jenkins (2018) further notes that
[w]hen Labour’s then transport secretary, Andrew 
Adonis, embarked on HS2 in 2009, it was in 
defiance of the 2006 Eddington report, which 
dismissed high-speed as outdated, voracious of 
energy and with poor rates of return.
Once again, it is telling that the northern parts of the line 
may now never be built.
4.3.3. Crossrail
With a funding deal of some £16bn (House of Commons 
Select Committee on Crossrail, 2007) Crossrail will increase 
 London’s total rail capacity by 10% (Glover, 2018). The line 
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will undoubtedly be of enormous benefit for busy commuters 
from the Royal County of Berkshire, as well as those further 
East in relatively ‘affordable’ parts of London and offers a con-
venient spur to Heathrow. Nevertheless, even before Crossrail 
has opened, there are plans for ‘Crossrail 2’, to connect Surrey 
to Hertfordshire via central London, with an estimated cost of 
some £31.2bn (Topham, Pidd, & Halliday, 2017). This would 
mark the fourth major rail project in London since 2000.
In addition to the fact that the project is being delivered late 
and over budget (which is, in fairness, not unusual in the world 
of large infrastructure projects), it is difficult to justify pouring 
further billions into the rail infrastructure of the Greater Lon-
don area ahead of improving transport links in metropolitan 
areas of the rest of the country. Indeed, for the cost of Crossrail, 
it would be possible to build 1,000 stations such as Kirkstall 
Forge in Leeds (which exceeded its expected annual passenger 
numbers within five months of opening). This simple example 
is just one illustration of the ‘latent demand’ for better infra-
structure in the regions exposed by such projects. Again, we 
refer back to the results of Chapters 2 and 3, suggesting that our 
adjusted figures imply that greater ‘bang-for-buck’ enhance-
ments to productivity and living standards might occur were 
such capital to be redeployed to the poorly served commuter 
networks in the Midlands and North.
For example, it is unsurprising that there is no obvious 
extant demand for public transport services between Skeg-
ness and Grimsby when it takes almost three hours by train 
and 3½ by bus to cover little more than 30 miles. Similarly, 
it can take at least an hour to travel the 11 miles between 
parts of Dudley and central Birmingham at rush hour via any 
means of transport. Even worse, the only trains between Wal-
sall and Wolverhampton (a distance of under 7.5 miles) travel 
via Birmingham and thus take over an hour, in spite of the 
existence of track between the two.
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Our analysis has already shown that these regions out-
perform their ‘official’ productivity: how much better could 
they do with the kind of funding received by London and the 
South East (or even Scotland). Given this, it’s hardly surpris-
ing that such regions are both amongst the poorest in the 
country and those that voted most strongly for Brexit.
4.4 THE BREXIT OVERHANG: WHAT MECHANISM 
FOR FUNDING ‘THE REGIONS’ AFTER BREXIT?
And it is to the immediate Brexit context that we now turn. 
There has been a lively debate in the literature over the effec-
tiveness of EU structural funding in the UK and elsewhere 
(Becker, Egger, & von Ehrlich, 2010). Currently, the UK ben-
efits from EU regional funding, under the premises of the 
European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF). Under 
this regime, approximately half of the UK share of ESIF over 
2014–2020 (approximately £24 billion) were allocated to 
areas that are identified as ‘less developed’ or ‘transitional’ 
(Bentley, 2018). In light of this, it is noteworthy that Bachtler 
(2017) argued that such EU Structural Funding has provided 
a long-term anchor for policy.
However, as noted, eligibility for structural funding corre-
lates poorly with many measures of deprivation. Our analy-
sis has argued that the measures underpinning this funding 
allocation are flawed. A key finding here was that regions 
such as Shropshire and Staffordshire qualify for higher lev-
els of funding on the basis of their GVA per capita but this 
ignored the household income (gross disposable household 
income, GDHI) side of the story – to reiterate, what we regard 
as a better measure to calculate deprivation. In this context, 
poorer areas such as the Black Country in the West Midlands 
were eligible for less money on the basis of having a GVA per 
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capita that exceeded EU thresholds. Yet, Brexit premises that 
this funding regime will no longer be applicable to the UK 
and thus offers the opportunity to revisit funding formulas.
This is of particular importance in light of findings that 
the effectiveness of cohesion spending is critically depend-
ent upon the proper identification of specific regional needs 
(Crescenzi, Fratesi, & Monastiriotis, 2017). Thus, whilst 
Brexit poses acute economic challenges, particularly in light 
of evidence suggesting that it might have starkly divergent 
regional impacts (Chen et al., 2018), it also presents oppor-
tunities for more appropriate targeting of regional policies 
(particularly in light of the devolution agenda).
With this in mind, the UK Government proposed a ‘Shared 
Prosperity Fund’ (BBC, 2017a) to substitute for the monies 
allocated under EU regional funding schemes. The Shared 
Prosperity Fund was first proposed by the Conservative Party 
in its 2017 Election manifesto (Conservative Party, 2017, p. 
30) and described as a fund ‘taken from money coming back 
to the UK as we leave the EU, to reduce inequalities between 
communities in our four nations’. In particular, that:
[t]he money that is spent will help deliver 
sustainable, inclusive growth based on our modern 
industrial strategy. We will consult widely on the 
design of the fund, including with the devolved 
administrations, local authorities, businesses and 
public bodies. The UK Shared Prosperity Fund will 
be cheap to administer, low in bureaucracy and 
targeted where it is needed most. (Conservative 
Party, 2017, p. 35; our emphasis)
Inferred from the above is that somehow EU funds are 
expensive to administer and highly bureaucratic. This does 
raise the issue of how one would administer such monies in a 
‘streamlined’ manner. However, the more substantive issue for 
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us is that of how areas with the most ‘need’ would be identi-
fied. Our analysis has suggested that measures such as real 
GDHI per capita (with our estimated regional price levels) 
would be better in this regard to a replacment ‘social fund’. 
However, the thresholds relative to mean earnings would be 
contingent on the monies available. The nature of targetting 
priority areas in itself might be influenced by other factors. 
Should ‘deprived’ areas be prioritised, wherever they are in the 
UK? Or, to reiterate, is there a case that the Core Cities outside 
of London, which our analysis suggests have performed better 
than conventional measures depict, be given favourable treat-
ment as nascent ‘agglomeration economies’ in themselves?
The above notwithstanding, practical discussion on the 
implementation of a new funding regime to compensate for 
the loss of ESIF post-2020 has been muted (Huggins, 2018). 
As Huggins notes, the launch of the UK Government’s indus-
try strategy paper in November 2017 provided an opportu-
nity to substantiate the nature of the Shared Prosperity Fund, 
but very little detail was provided (Huggins, 2018, p. 144). 
Thus, even as late as August 2018 (at the time of writing) 
a high degree of uncertainty remains as to regional funding 
levels after Brexit.
In a sense, this should not be surprising. We would argue 
that this is so for a number of reasons. First, the obvious cave-
at is that any post-Brexit regional monies will be contingent on 
the size of the ‘divorce bill’ to be paid to the EU.4 Second, given 
that the vast consensus of the economic impact of Brexit is 
that it will result in foregone revenue to the UK Treasury, there 
will be added impetus for Treasury to ‘claw back’ these monies 
(reinforcing long-standing practices in this regard). In addi-
tion, the thrust of regional policy in England in recent years 
having been for greater centralisation and control, we have lit-
tle reason to expect that the fund will have any substance to it. 
Finally, there remains the question of how much money would 
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actually be ‘new’, rather than recycled from existing funding 
tranches. European regional funding takes place on a matched 
basis by the UK Government (Huggins, 2018) so in a very real 
sense, on current allocations, half of any incipient Shared pros-
perity fund (SPF) would consist of moneys already allocated.
The implication of the above is that there is a risk that 
any post-Brexit regional funding settlement will be distinct-
ly lacking in any real semblance of ‘regional rebalancing’. 
Indeed, infrastructure concerns continue to be dominated by 
projects proposed for London and the South East (more nar-
rowly defined here as a London–Cambridge–-Oxford ‘golden 
triangle’), as HS2, Crossrail, Heathrow expansion, and the 
advocacy by the National Infrastructure Commission and 
the Highways Agency for a new expressway between Oxford 
and Cambridge to service a million additional homes (Mon-
biot, 2018) show. That such proposals appear a fait accom-
pli, without any significant economic or social justification, 
or democratic debate (Monbiot, 2018), in turn only serves 
to reiterate the urgent need to address the regional balance 
of power, and resourcing in the UK. It is to this that we turn 
in the next section of the case for ‘meaningful devolution’ for 
the English regions, to match those of the devolved nations.
4.5 THE CASE FOR ‘MEANINGFUL DEVOLUTION’
The creation of the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly 
in 1998 arguably marked the most significant reconfiguration 
of powers in the UK since its creation in 1707, as a ‘histori-
cally centralized “union state”, […] which recently has been 
transformed by processes of devolution’ (Pike & Tomaney, 
2009, pp. 18–19). Scotland has a devolved administration 
in the form of the Scottish Government, which has a clearly 
defined role and is widely considered to be democratically 
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accountable to the public, as evidenced by steadily increas-
ing voter turnout at Scottish elections since 2003 (Aiton et 
al., 2016).
In contrast, since the 1970s, domestic regional policy 
across the UK has been progressively reduced in its scope of 
operation (Bachtler, 2017). Over the past decade, regional 
governance arrangements in England in particular (except-
ing London) have become highly fragmented and particularly 
prone to the vagaries of policy changes. This has seen the 
abolition of Regional Development Agencies, the creation of 
Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs), Combined Authorities, 
various ‘enterprise zones’ and the emergence of the ‘Northern 
Powerhouse’ and ‘Midlands Engine’ brands (Bachtler, 2017; 
Bentley, Bailey, & Shutt, 2010). Unlike the Scottish Parlia-
ment, these opaque entities have struggled to secure legiti-
macy in the eyes of a sceptical public struggling to understand 
their functions and perceiving them primarily in terms being 
unelected and hence unaccountable.5 This is of concern 
given that a wide and growing range of literature suggests 
that governance and institutional quality are crucial factors 
in regional development (Bachtler & Begg, 2018). However, 
as Bentley (2018) notes, the discussion of devolution for the 
English regions in Westminster policy circles has abated: ‘[w]
ith all attention on Brexit, the drive for devolution has waned’ 
(Bentley, 2018).
There is thus a clear need to move beyond the current 
limited debate on devolution and ‘regional rebalancing’, and 
actually embrace a new constitutional settlement for the UK 
(Budd, 2018) with attendant transfer of resourcing decision-
making ability. Indeed, if the UK is to survive as a political 
entity post-Brexit, we would argue that this is essential. For 
us, perceptions of social exclusion, or otherwise ‘being left 
behind’ – particularly in the ‘Missing Middle’ of the UK – 
could be related to a lack of suitably devolved governance 
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arrangements within England (and Wales, to a degree). 
As such, Brexit poses a challenge to traditional notions of 
governance (Stoker, 1998), in that governance ‘is ultimately 
concerned with creating the conditions for ordered rule and 
collective action’ (Stoker, 1998, p. 17, emphasis added). 
Collective action in itself though requires some semblance 
of community and solidarity in the pursuit of basic shared 
objectives (Ostrom & Ahn, 2009). Hence, if the inequalities 
brought into sharp focus by Brexit are to be addressed, then 
‘meaningful’ devolution cannot be done in a ‘top-down’ or 
‘dirigiste’ manner, but rather, must engage directly with voters 
in order to overcome a perceived democratic deficit.
What would ‘meaningful devolution’ look like, then? Ide-
ally, we would suggest that such a devolution would be one 
characterised by governance arrangements whereby voters in 
a given (e.g. English) region directly elect representatives to 
make decisions on resourcing priorities for their area. Against 
this we would stress that the English experience with regional 
devolution has not given cause for optimism in this regard, 
having noted the failure of a referendum on the creation of 
an elected regional assembly in the North East of England 
in late 2004 (Pike & Tomaney, 2009, p. 24).6 Indeed, Eng-
lish identities seem firmly rooted in local orientations, rather 
than regional ones, as our own focus group studies under the 
auspices of the ‘CBS Roadshow’ also have demonstrated (De 
Ruyter et al., Forthcoming).7 As the experience with Metro 
Mayors has shown, local parochialism is difficult to over-
come in trying to consolidate governance mechanisms at the 
regional level. We are then left with the somewhat problem-
atic thought that some element of top-down imposition is 
required to enact such structures, rather than relying on the 
local ‘democratic will’. However, further research is needed 
in this regard to ascertain what the ideal form of regionally 
devolved governance in England would be.
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However, the level of governance notwithstanding, given 
the manifest disparities in funding between London, Scot-
land and the English regions, a necessary reform would be an 
updated funding formula to equalise per capita funding across 
the UK at the GOR level of public services and infrastructure 
(see Forrest et al., 2017, for a discussion of this). Of course, the 
question remains as to which policies should be devolved to a 
regional level. For this we need to revisit the debate between 
‘people versus place’ policies, in order to arrive at a better 
understanding of what the optimal scale (national/regional/
local) for policy design and delivery should be.
4.6 MOVING BEYOND ‘PEOPLE VERSUS PLACE’: 
PUTTING IT TOGETHER IN A POLICY FRAMEWORK
The argument over whether policies to help those living in 
lagging regions should be ‘place based’ or ‘people centred’ 
has a long academic pedigree (Barca, McCann, & Rodríguez-
Pose, 2012). Divergent views are clear internationally, with 
some arguing of ‘the futility of providing economic incentives 
for staying and striving in lagging regions’ (Gill, 2010) and 
that institutions should be ‘space-blind’ (World Bank, 2009). 
Indeed, the World Bank (2009) goes so far as to argue that 
economic growth ‘will be unbalanced’ (World Bank, 2009). 
As such, this view has been criticised on the grounds it ignores 
sociospatial factors (Murphy, 2011).
In contrast to the ‘people-centred’ vision espoused by Gill 
(2010), others argue in favour of a ‘place-based’ approach 
to policy (Bentley & Pugalis, 2014). As noted by the latter 
researchers, in the post-war period, ‘local development poli-
cies veered between being targeted interventions intended 
to improve property (e.g. business accommodation, hous-
ing stock, etc.), and those intended to improve people 
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(e.g. workforce skills, education, etc.)’ (Bentley & Pugalis, 
2014, p. 286). Nevertheless, since the advent of the neolib-
eral consensus in economic policy from the premiership of 
Thatcher onwards, policy interventions in the UK have over-
whelmingly been people-focussed. In recent years, even indus-
trial policy has become more centralised (Peck, Connolly, 
Durnin, & Jackson, 2013).
Indeed, even many innovations that ostensibly have a 
regional focus, of which LEPs are probably the best exam-
ple, have ultimately ended up being delivery vehicles for an 
increasingly centralised set of policies (Bailey, 2011; Bentley 
et al., 2010). It is clear from many of the ‘strategic economic 
plans’ adopted by LEPs that most focus on the same handful 
of sectors that happen to be ‘in vogue’, almost irrespective of 
their real local strengths (Swinney, Larkin, & Webber, 2010). 
Further academic critique has focussed on the ‘missing middle’ 
in terms of regional policy (Bentley et al., 2010), together with 
their lack of financial firepower (Bentley et al., 2010) and the 
absence of statutory ‘teeth’ (Pugalis, Shutt, & Bentley, 2012).
It is ironic that the intellectual underpinnings of this con-
sensus stem from traditional economic orthodoxy: the primacy 
of the neoliberal agenda coincided with economic orthodoxy 
moving decisively away from many of the intellectual founda-
tions that it formed. This was perhaps most obvious in the 
development of the new Keynesian school of macroeconom-
ics, which has come to dominate modern DSGE8 modelling 
(Stiglitz, 2018). In the same vein, there can be no doubt that 
the ‘new economic geography’ associated with Krugman 
(1991) and others is now firmly mainstream. Indeed, the trac-
table mathematical model of imperfect competition pioneered 
by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) has become a workhorse of mod-
ern economics and is one of the ‘bag of tricks’ used by those 
economists seeking to understand why economic activities and 
certain industries ‘cluster’ in certain places (Krugman, 1998).
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Our contention is that the debate over ‘people versus place’ 
has grown stale. What is instead needed is a realistic concep-
tual framework within which to evaluate where ‘space neu-
tral’ policies are most appropriate, and where such policies 
can become damagingly ‘spatially-blind’ and engender ‘per-
verse spatial outcomes’(Bentley & Pugalis, 2014, p. 289). We 
therefore posit the following policy framework within which 
to frame the discussion and avoid what Barca et al. (2012, 
p. 139) refer to as ‘explicit spatial effects, many of which will 
undermine the aims of the policy itself’.
Thus, in putting forward a framework, or recommenda-
tions, for regional policy in a post-Brexit landscape, we return 
to the dichotomy between incomes (measured by GDHI per 
capita), which are ultimately what define living standards, and 
productivity (measured by GVA per hour worked), which is a 
fundamental measure of economic performance.9 In essence, 
to reiterate, regional policy must be characterised by mean-
ingful devolution of powers, as well as resources, from central 
government. Hence, we capture this by putting forward the 
following very simple Bigger-Better-Bolder (or B-B-B) frame-
work for devolution:
4.6.1. Bigger and Better
Simply put, meaningful devolution means greater sums of 
money allocated to the regions. This can take place directly via 
increased UK Government funding of the regions; but also in 
enabling regions greater powers to secure resources themselves. 
In terms of central government funding, we propose that the 
‘Shared Prosperity Fund’ consist of two key funding tranches:
•	 A ‘social fund’ to replace the current UK allocation of 
European social fund (ESF) monies (including matched UK 
government contribution) in order to tackle deprivation. 
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This fund would be allocated to areas on the basis of 
our identified metric of adjusted GDHI per capita at the 
local authority level. Crucially, this should be done on the 
basis of measures that account for differences in regional 
prices. For example, the London borough of Barking 
and Dagenham should not be penalised simply because 
it is in a high-cost region. Similarly, Portsmouth and 
Southampton (alongside large parts of the eastern reaches 
of the River Thames) are every bit as poor in real terms 
as more northerly regions in the UK. Finally, using such 
figures would acknowledge the fact that, in real terms after 
adjusting for purchasing power, many of the poorest parts 
of the UK lie in the Midlands rather than the North, and 
they have a commensurately large need for funding.
Whilst GDHI per capita is not perfect (as it still conceals 
inequalities within a given area), we argue that this 
would represent a dramatic improvement over doling 
out such monies on the basis of GVA per capita. As the 
methodology develops (an item we take up under ‘further 
research’ in our Conclusion section), we would suggest 
that the funding mechanism thereof could be further 
refined to consider household income deciles within a 
given local authority GDHI per capita average, as a means 
to ‘prioritise’, or target, locales for funding.
•	 An ‘infrastructure fund’ to replace the current UK 
European regional development funding (ERDF) 
allocation (including matched UK government 
contribution) to the regions. This fund would be allocated 
to areas on the basis of our estimated regional productivity 
figures. This infrastructure fund would include funding 
for infrastructure as broadly defined, which would 
include both physical transport and digital infrastructure. 
On this basis the current disparity in transport funding 
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levels between London and the English regions would be 
reduced from over 200% to only 20–30% (which whilst 
not ‘equalised’, provide a robust metric of economic 
performance of which to assess infrastructure needs 
against). Ideally, these monies would be allocated at the 
GOR level (i.e. NUTS1; coterminous with the now defunct 
regional development agencies (RDAs) in England). 
However, in the absence of this, the Mayoral Combined 
Authorities would be a good starting point, as the natural 
foci of city-regions within the UK, where the greatest ‘bang 
for buck’ for infrastructure spend could be demonstrated.
4.6.2. Bolder
In addition to the two proposed funding streams identified 
above (and accompanying allocation mechanisms) we pro-
pose that further powers be transferred from central govern-
ment down the regional level. Key here is that in addition to 
powers over spending decisions, should come the power to 
raise resources, that is, via taxation and borrowing powers 
above and beyond that of current levels as depicted in Coun-
cil Tax and business rates. As inferred from our earlier mate-
rial, transport, health and education would be obvious areas.
Of course, this then raises questions over what the ‘optimal 
scale’ of different interventions. What interventions should be 
undertaken on a national level, that is, be ‘space-blind’ – and 
what should be done at a subnational level? In general, access 
to quality education should not be contingent upon location. 
Existing policies contradict this: education spending per stu-
dent varies widely across the UK and schools can find them-
selves disadvantaged by their particular situation with respect 
to aspects of their intake. Similar issues can manifest them-
selves depending on the age of the school infrastructure: older 
 buildings are costly to maintain, particularly if the school has 
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shrunk. Although the government is in the process of introducing 
a new funding formula for schools, it is far from clear whether 
this will adequately tackle the historic regional divide. Whilst 
a detailed examination of education spending is beyond the 
scope of this book, one’s life chances and opportunities should 
not be contingent upon one’s location. Moreover, the spatial 
element to education is clear: for most schools, admission cri-
teria are (at least in part) dependent upon location.
In contrast, funding to tackle deprivation and social exclu-
sion should be as locally focussed as possible (at least within 
the confines of the data we have available to us). Deprivation 
is typically highly spatially concentrated: often at the ward 
level or below. In contrast, control over transport and infra-
structure spending most naturally resides at the regional level. 
Beyond this, there is a clear necessity for greater control over 
decisions at a subnational level, representing a ‘revolution in 
devolution’ for the UK.
In this context, we argue that Scotland potentially pro-
vides a good model for such a ‘devolution framework’. Again, 
we would suggest that such powers should operate at the 
GOR/NUTS1 level, but in the absence of such structures, the 
combined authorities seem a natural starting point (with the 
added advantage that they have some modicum of democrat-
ic accountability – in contrast to the former RDAs). However, 
the challenge would come in terms of engaging with local 
communities to assess (or try to engender) support for such 
measures. As noted, attempts to legitimise regional govern-
ance structures in England have been problematic at best and 
further work is needed in this regard.
4.7 CONCLUSION
In this chapter, we have sought to tease out the policy implica-
tions of our analysis. We have argued that existing measures 
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used to allocate regional funding are fundamentally flawed 
and built upon previous chapters to comprehensively demon-
strate why this is the case. Moreover, even when not explicitly 
used to allocate funding, such measures are at best unhelpful 
and more often actively damaging insofar as they shape per-
ceptions of relative regional success and where the greatest 
economic need and returns are.
We have thus argued that Brexit presents British regional 
policy with a fundamental challenge, but also an opportunity. 
The challenge is that Brexit threatens to exacerbate existing 
spatial inequalities (Chen et al., 2018) and, worse, those areas 
that voted most strongly for Brexit appear most vulnerable 
(Los et al., 2017). As a result, a vote that may in part have 
stemmed from the problems of those areas left behind (Rod-
ríguez-Pose, 2018), threatens to worsen them. The opportu-
nity, however, lies in fact that Brexit challenges us to do better.
Brexit challenges us to ensure that the gains from globalisa-
tion are more equally spread and that no region is left behind. As 
such, post-Brexit regional policy (whether under the guise of a 
‘shared prosperity fund’ or other vehicle), needs to take account 
of real regional disparities, rather than nominal ones. Our fig-
ures suggest that greater spending on education and transport 
infrastructure in London and Scotland have paid dividends in 
enhancing productivity and living standards. A truly coherent 
post-Brexit regional policy must also build on what works well 
in these regions – most notably real power over policies – to 
offer a devolution deal that works for the whole country.
NOTES
1. Even if Brexit does not ultimately occur, the results of the 
referendum bear out in striking fashion the need to revisit these 
issues, and our recommendations have a pan-European dimension.
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2. Strictly speaking, Heathrow airport expansion would constitute 
private sector expenditure. However, the money needed to re-
route the M25 around (or under) the proposed development have 
been contested and the prospect remains that the state being the 
ultimate bearer of risk here would foot the bill should the owners 
of Heathrow not have sufficient money to undertake the work 
(Topham, 2018).
3. And with Edinburgh providing a microcosm of this phenomenon 
in Scotland; again because of its being a (relatively small-scale) 
concentration of political and financial power (BBC News, 2015).
4. See Clancy and De Ruyter (2018) for a critical analysis of the 
figures cited here for the ‘divorce bill’.
5. Mirroring charges that have been levelled (not always entirely 
fairly) at the EU by many voters (Follesdal & Hix, 2006).
6. Significant factors here were what Pike and Tomaney (2009, p. 
24) described as ‘apparent disquiet concerning its weak and limited 
set of powers and financial capabilities, subregional tensions and 
rivalries, uneven enthusiasm as well as outright hostility amongst 
some elements of central government…’ (Pike & Tomaney, 2009).
7. Examples here include residents of Sutton Coldfield resolutely 
refusing to identify themselves as ‘Brummies’, and the shared notion 
of being from the West Midlands stark in being absent from any 
conversation (Pike & Tomaney, 2009).
8. ‘Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium’.
9. Of course the two are closely linked: an area with low real 
productivity cannot sustain a high standard of living for its 
workforce (and those who are dependent on their taxes and/or 
savings – including the elderly).




The major constituent parts of GDHI are:
•	 Gross operating surplus: Household income from the 
rental of buildings, including the imputed rent1 of owner-
occupied dwellings.
•	 Mixed income: This is primarily income from 
self-employment.
•	 Compensation of employees: This is the largest individual 
item and consists of remuneration paid to employees 
including gross wages and salaries and any benefits in 
kind. It also includes social security payments made by the 
employer on behalf of employees.
•	 Property income: Confusingly, this refers to investment 
income and not income from property rents. It includes 
interest income, share dividends, rents on agricultural 
land and investment income attributable to insurance 
policyholders and pension funds. The latter item is 
somewhat subtle and the interested reader is referred to 
the Office for National Statistics’ (ONS) methodology 
guide for additional clarifications and details.
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•	 Social contributions and social benefits: These include 
government welfare spending (including state pensions, 
maternity benefits, disability payment, unemployment 
benefits and housing benefit amongst others) and private 
pensions. This category also covers a variety of other 
minor items and the interested reader is again referred to 
the ONS’ methodology guide.
•	 Other current transfers: This category lumps together a 
variety of income sources, including insurance settlements, 
grants, gifts, etc.
From these headings are subtracted:
•	 Primary income paid: This primarily consists of interest 
payments made by households including mortgage interest 
payments and the interest on other consumer loans. It does 
not include the capital repayment portion of any mortgages.
•	 Taxes: These include taxes on income, wealth and other 
taxes (for example council tax)
•	 Social contributions/benefits paid: This category includes 
payments by both employees and employers. These 
include pension contributions and national insurance 
contributions.
•	 Other current transfers: Once again, this category 
lumps together a variety of payments, including non-
life insurance premiums and a variety of other smaller 
payments (including fines, transfers of money abroad etc.)
APPENDIX 2: THE EKS METHOD
One solution is to choose a base region and construct a price 
index that evaluates the prices of each other region using 
the spending structure of the base region. This is a so-called 
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Laspeyres index. The relative price levels depend heavily on which 
region is chosen as a ‘base’ and there is no reason to choose one 
region above another. One way around this is to use the spend-
ing structure of the UK as a whole as a base. Unfortunately, this 
method does suffer from certain key weaknesses: it is not scale 
invariant (approaching a Laspeyres index with the largest region 
as a base) and is more vulnerable to (stochastic) measurement 
errors than our preferred method (Dikhanov, 1997).
Many (including the authors) would argue that the Fisher 
Ideal Index is an optimum measure of bilateral relative prices. It 
is the only homogeneous2 symmetric3 average of the Laspeyres 
and Paasche indices that is base-invariant4 (Diewert, 2004). As 
such, in a certain sense it can be seen as dealing optimally with 
the substitution effect (where the Laspeyres and Paasche indi-
ces are extremes). Unfortunately the Fisher index is not transi-
tive: the direct purchasing power parity (PPP) is not necessarily 
equal to the indirect PPP (derived via a third country).
Our preferred method is the Èltetö-Köves-Szulc (EKS) 
method used by Eurostat and the OECD in cross-country 
comparisons (OECD, 2012). It provides transitive price levels 
that are as close as possible to the bilateral Fisher relative 
price levels. This is the so-called property of charactericity 
(see OECD, 2012, for further details) and is an important 
motivator in using the EKS method over alternatives.
As noted, no system of comparing regional prices is perfect 
and unlike some alternatives, the EKS procedure is not addi-
tive: PPPs for the constituent components of consumer spend-
ing or GDP do not add up to the PPP calculated for spending or 
GDP as a whole. Moreover, real incomes (or real GDP) do not 
sum to their nominal counterpart. In other words, the real GDP 
of each region (deflated by a PPP calculated according to the 
EKS method) does not add up to the GDP of the UK as a whole.
Nevertheless, the authors believe additivity to be a less 
important attribute than scale invariance. If all quantities in a 
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given region double but prices remain identical then the rela-
tive price levels shouldn’t change. In addition, it is desirable 
that the index chosen should be base invariant (i.e. it should 
not matter which region is chosen as Region 1). A further 
major consideration here is the fact that the ONS RRCPLs 
that we use as a data source are compiled on this basis.
In practical terms, the precise method used does not appear 
to materially affect our results. The overall differences when 
using the GK method instead of EKS appear in the order of a 
single percentage point for most regions. Although this is sig-
nificant, the overall trend of London being far more expensive 
than any other region (and northern England and Wales being 
particularly inexpensive) remains unchanged.
In practical terms, we calculate the EKS price levels by cal-
culating Laspeyres, Paasche and (thus) Fisher indices for each 
region before applying the EKS procedure to the latter and 
standardising the results. Whilst we lack data on quantities 
consumed by region, the Living Costs and Food survey does 
allow us to calculate weights that can be used as an input via 






























































The Fisher index is the geometric average of the Laspeyres 























Price levels are standardised by dividing each region’s price 
level by the geometric average of all price levels.
APPENDIX 3: FISIM
A further technical issue involves the calculation of the size 
of the financial services sector. Whilst this is a national issue, 
it has an exaggerated regional impact because the activities 
of the financial services sector are spatially concentrated. 
Regional GVA are calculated by ‘regionalising’ the output of 
each industry (as reported in the National Accounts).5 Natu-
rally, certain regions specialise in certain industries. Whilst 
the methodology for regionalisation employed by the ONS 
Regional Accounts team is robust, if the output of a particu-
lar industry is overstated or understated on a national level, 
any disparities will be magnified on a regional level. This is 
of particular concern in the case of financial services, both 
because FISIM6 is known to overstate the output of the finan-
cial services sector and because the latter is overwhelmingly 
concentrated in London. As a result, this artificially inflates 
the GVA of London at the expense of the rest of the UK.
This problem comes about because, unlike most sectors 
of the economy, the financial services sector does not charge 
directly for the services that it provides. Instead, money is lent 
out at higher interest rates than it is borrowed. FISIM there-
fore works by multiplying the amount lent by the interest rate 
charged and subtracting the interest charged on borrowings. 
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The reason that this overstates financial services output is 
because it takes no account of risk (if a large proportion of 
debtors default then interest charged needs to be high just to 
cover these losses).
As a result, in times of financial stress it can produce 
particularly perverse results: official figures suggest that the 
financial services sector grew by over 16% in 2009 during 
the nadir of the financial crisis (at a time when banks were 
reporting enormous losses and receiving state aid). In real-
ity, of course, this result is generated by the fact that the risk 
premium spiked dramatically, leading to a huge disparity 
between borrowing and lending rates.
The ONS is constrained by international and European 
conventions in how it calculates FISIM. Whilst attempts 
have been made to quantify the impact on GDP of adjusting 
FISIM for risk (Akritidis & Francis, 2017; Haldane, Bren-
nan, & Madouros, 2010), doing so on the components of 
GVA is much more difficult. Nevertheless, adjustments can be 
made by users of statistics. One can exclude financial services 
entirely from regional output and thus estimate the size of the 
‘non-financial economy’.
Obviously this is a conceptually different output to GVA 
for the whole economy and in areas with a large financial ser-
vices sector it will not give an accurate view of the economy 
as a whole. To calculate regional productivity it is then neces-
sary to estimate the number of workers (and ideally hours 
worked) in the financial services sector in each region before 
dividing non-financial output by the size of the non-financial 
workforce. The only figures available are from the Business 
Register and Employment Survey, which are not completely 
comparable to their counterparts in the ONS’ official regional 
productivity statistics. We also lack any viable measure of the 
number of hours worked per job in the non-financial sector 
of the economy.
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Alternatively, one can seek to use the regional shares 
calculated by the ONS and input an alternative measure of 
financial services output, for which the experimental statistics 
compiled by the ONS are likely to prove extremely useful 
(Akritidis & Francis, 2017). These show that risk-adjusted 
FISIM output was around £10–12bn, potentially reducing 
nominal GDP by up to 0.7% (Akritidis & Francis, 2017). 
This reduces total financial services output by around one-
sixth. Ultimately the impact of doing so is rather small reduc-
ing London’s productivity advantage over the rest of the 
country by around one percentage point.
NOTES
1. Imputed rent refers to the amount that owner–occupiers would 
have to pay in order to rent their homes on the open market. 
Strictly speaking, this is the ‘income’ associated with owning the 
housing asset. It is discussed in more detail below.
2. Doubling both the Laspeyres and Paasche indices should double 
the average.
3. Symmetric in the sense of giving both regions equal importance.
4. Meaning that it is irrelevant whether one chooses the West 
Midlands, North East or Great Britain overall as a ‘home region’.




regional%20gross%20value%20added.pdf. When the ONS 
publish the figures on 13 December, there will hopefully be a fuller 
methodology document I can reference.
6. Financial Intermediation Services Indirectly Measured.
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